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PEACE THROUGH DEVELOPMENT II

BURKINA FASO, CHAD, AND NIGER

IMPACT EVALUATION ENDLINE REPORT



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Acronyms

ATEP	Association Tchadienne pour l'Étude de la Population
CASPA	Centre d'Analyses et d'Actions Pour la Sécurité et la Paix / Center for Analysis of Actions for Security of the Country
CERFODES	Centre d'Études de Recherches et de Formation Pour le Développement Économique et Sociale / Center for Studies, Research and Training for Economic and Social Development
CESEV	Cabinet d'Expertise Suivi-Evaluation
CVE	Countering Violent Extremism
DiD	Difference-in-Differences
EAS	Evaluation & Analytical Services
IRD	International Relief and Development
NGO	Non-Governmental Organization
PDev II	Peace through Development II
TMG	The Mitchell Group, Inc.
USAID	United States Agency for International Development
USAID/WA	Regional Mission of the United States Agency for International Development for West Africa in Accra, Ghana
VE	Violent Extremism

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Peace through Development II

Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger

Impact Evaluation Executive Summary

The threat of violent extremism has risen sharply in West Africa over the past decade, becoming arguably the top threat to regional security. The increased concern has spawned a proliferation of efforts to prevent and counter violent extremism, yet there is little rigorous analysis assessing the effectiveness of these interventions. The USAID-supported quasi-experimental evaluation of Peace through Development II (PDEV II) conducted by the University of Pittsburgh aims to contribute to the nascent literature on countering violent extremism (CVE) and help practitioners in West Africa better understand what approaches are most effective.

Peace through Development II

PDEV II was a five-year, \$59 million program that aimed to increase resilience to violent extremism in at-risk communities in Burkina Faso, Chad, and Niger from November 2011 to December 2016. The program had three sub-goals: 1) improved social cohesion; 2) enhanced resilience to extremism, and; 3) improved civic outlook, which it sought to achieve through implementation of four multi-faceted, strategic objectives:

1. **Youth More Empowered** through expanded livelihoods via vocational and entrepreneurial skills training, civic education, capacity building for youth associations, and leadership training among young men and women;
2. **Moderate Voices Increased** through integrated radio, social media, civic education, and conflict resolution activities, enhancing the quality of credible information, and encouraging positive dialogue;
3. **Civil Society Capacity Increased** through training, strengthening advocacy and issue-based campaigns integrated with radio and social media, and enhanced civil society organization coalitions and networks;
4. **Local Government Strengthened** through organized community entities and CSO capacity, citizen participation, and training in public administration, transparency, advocacy, and government outreach.

PDEV II designated 45 “core zones” across the three target countries that received the full array of program activities and 56 “non-core zones” that received only radio programming. However, 12 of these non-core zones either failed to receive a radio signal or received a radio signal only in the very last month of the program.

Evaluation Design

The evaluation hypothesis posited that a layered number of activities would have an effect on community perceptions related to violent extremism that would be detectable in a

randomized community-level survey. The evaluation team conducted baseline (7,720), midline (2,577) and endline (7,888) surveys in 83 P-Dev II zones, of which 38 core zones, 34 non-core zones, and 11 no-activity zones. The team also collected qualitative data via 30 focus groups and 45 in-depth interviews across at endline. Eighteen indicators, or outcome measures, were selected, each relating to one of the three sub-goals of the program. Two additional innovative procedures, known as "list" and "endorsement" experimental methods, were included in an attempt to overcome potential social desirability biases associated with responses to sensitive questions. Two difference-in-difference analyses attempted to assess the program as follows: 1) 38 core zones were compared to 34 non-core zones to assess the impact of community programming (non-radio), and; 2) 34 non-core zones were compared to 11 no-activity zones to assess the impact of radio programming.

Findings

Overall the study presents mixed results with respect to community programming. Across the three countries, only two of eighteen indicators showed statistically significant effects. However, country-specific analysis showed variable impacts of the program, especially in Burkina Faso where positive program impact was noted on eight indicators. Chad and Niger demonstrated essentially null community-level impact, with one or few positive and adverse effects noted in each country. Non-significant indicator results suggest a more statically powerful study may uncover a significant impact of the program on these outcomes, although effect size would likely be small. The experimental indicators were statistically insignificant, but suggestive that the program may have decreased support for Islamic extremist groups in PDEV II core versus other zones.

Analysis of radio programming, pooled across the three countries, showed significant impacts on four indicators and analysis of project documents noted that these indicators were among those which the radio programming was most directly designed to influence. Importantly, the standardized program effects on the four indicators showed medium to large changes in perceptions. While the smaller sample size available for radio programming analysis did not allow for a country-by-country comparison, the radio portion of PDEV II programming should be viewed as a qualified success.

Table 1: Summary of Results: Difference-in-Difference Analysis

	Community Programming 38 Core Zones vs 34 Non-Core (Radio-Only) Zones				Radio Programming 34 Non-Core Zones vs 11 No Activity Zones
	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Sample	Pooled Sample
Social Cohesion					
Intended Effect Significant	1	.	4	1	1
Intended Effect, Non-Significant	2	1	1	3	2
Adverse Effect
Resilience to Extremism					
Intended Effect, Significant	1	.	4	1	3
Intended Effect, Non-Significant	2	6	4	3	3
Adverse Effect	1
Civic Outlook					
Intended Effect, Significant	.	1	.	.	.
Intended Effect, Non-Significant	2	.	4	3	1
Adverse Effect	1	1	.	.	1
Experimental Evidence					
Intended Effect, Non-Significant	1	2	2	2	N/A
Reduced Support for an Attack with Potential Civilian Casualties				3.3%	N/A
Reduced Support for Islamist Group AQIM				15.1%	N/A

A variety of additional analyses were performed to unpack the program’s mixed pattern of results.

Intensity of programming matters. A comparison of impacts in high-intensity zones, where relatively more program activities were implemented, versus low-intensity zones revealed greater impacts in the zones where the program was most active. The analysis suggests that non-radio results are driven by high-intensity programming, where more activities and higher spending occurred.

Limited impact of spending per capita. A comparison of impacts in core zones with relatively larger and smaller populations showed that per capita spending on activities was generally not a significant indicator of effects.

Positive but limited effects of PDEV II activities. Qualitative analysis conveyed the overall impression that PDEV II activities had positive effects but were often more limited in scope than local residents would have wished. Respondents found that activities generated increased community awareness, sensitization, and public dialogue, reinforcing social cohesion. Livelihood support activities, such as vocational training improved youth opportunities, were found to increase perceptions of self-sufficiency and family support. However, respondents stressed that the PDEV II activities reached too small a group of beneficiaries, with limited access for many in the community due to the program’s youth focus.

Influence of Context. Program results in Chad are likely related to the difficult operating environment, resulting in implementation challenges and relatively fewer activities in core communities. The qualitative evidence also suggests that the downturn in oil prices in Chad and the uptick in Boko Haram attacks in Niger had important overarching effects in

those countries. Finally, a review of the core communities' exposure to violence over the life of the program revealed significant terrorist violence, particularly in Chad and Niger.

The Special Case of Burkina Faso?

The additional analyses were unable to definitively identify the reasons for program success in Burkina Faso. Nonetheless, a variety of potential factors emerged, including:

- Communities in Burkina Faso began with lower social cohesion, resilience to extremism and civic outlook scores compared to Chad and Niger, which offered a greater opportunity for improvement.
- Programming in Burkina Faso started later and ended earlier than Niger and Chad, while still spending a comparative amount per core zone, creating a more sustained effort over a shorter period of time, potentially leading to greater impact. This aligns with the overall finding that high-intensity programming produces relatively greater results.
- The geographic concentration of core communities in Burkina offered logistical and coordination advantages over Chad and Niger.
- Program implementation in Burkina Faso had a relatively greater focus on youth events, such as mobile cinema and participatory theater training, which may have increased community-level effects.
- Burkina Faso experienced far less extremist violence during program implementation relative to Niger and Chad. It is possible that violence somehow mitigated program impacts in those countries.

Recommendations

The study demonstrates that layered CVE activities can have an effect on community perceptions related to violent extremism. However, programming must be concentrated and high-intensity to achieve lasting results and country- and community-level variations are certain to nuance impact. Two primary recommendations for CVE practitioners emerge:

- Given scarce programming resources, community-level activities should be concentrated more intensively in fewer zones.
- Radio programming represents an effective, low-cost way of changing perceptions linked to violent extremism.

In addition, the evaluation indicates several important directions for new research:

- Larger numbers of interviews are needed in order to increase the ability of studies to detect statistically significant effects.
- Further explore experimental, unobtrusive methods of measuring extremism.
- Examine the effects of CVE programming in the context of differing levels of extremist violence.

I. Introduction

A. Overview of Report

This report presents the results of the endline analysis of the impact of the Peace through Development (PDEV II) program on a series of outcomes related to countering violent extremism and strengthening community resilience in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso. We use a combination of survey data, program activity trackers and quarterly reports, and qualitative data collected in all of the zones in which the PDEV II program was active in the three countries. The evaluation consists of the analysis of data from baseline surveys conducted in each of the three countries in 2013 along with new interviews conducted in 2015-2016 and 2017 in order to determine whether PDEV II activities led to changes in community and individual-level outcomes corresponding to the primary goals of the program: improving social cohesion, resilience to violent extremism, and improving the educational and employment outlook for youth.

The basic design of the impact evaluation consists of comparisons between core zones and non-core zones in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Core zones are areas that were designated by International Relief and Development (IRD), the implementing entity for PDEV II, and USAID for exposure to the full array of PDEV II program activities, while non-core zones are areas that received only the program's media treatments, primarily radio programming related to good governance and countering violent extremism among youth. The program was initially expected to operate in a total of 83 zones in the three countries. Yet, 11 of those zones either failed to receive radio signal or received radio signal in the last month of the program. We refer to those zones as 'no-activity zones.' Of the remaining 72 zones, 38 core zones were exposed to the full array of program activities, while 34 non-core zones received only the program's media treatments. Baseline survey data was collected in 2013 on 7,720 respondents in the 83 zones, following procedures described in Finkel et al. (2014).¹ Mid-line survey data was collected in 2015-2016 on 2,577 respondents in the same 83 zones. Endline survey data was collected in 2017 on 7,888 respondents in the same 83 zones as well as 2 additional non-activity zones.²

The longitudinal structure of the data allows for estimation of "difference-in-differences" (DiD) in program outcomes, that is, over time comparison of the changes in program-relevant outcomes in core zones and changes in program-relevant outcomes in non-core zones from the baseline interviews to the endline. The DiD represents the estimated effect that can be attributed to the non-radio portion of PDEV II programming. This basic comparison between core and non-core zones regarding changes over time is then supplemented with more nuanced analyses. First, we make use of the quarterly PDEV II activity trackers to determine which zones in each country received more and less extensive programmatic activities, as measured by the amount of dollars allocated to

¹ Steven E. Finkel, Reynaldo Rojo Mendoza, Cassilde Schwartz, Chris Belasco, and Aaron Abbarno. 2014. "Baseline Report for Impact Evaluation of the Peace through Development Program II (PDEV II) in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso." Report submitted to USAID/West Africa.

² Those non-activity zones are Assinet in Chad and Dan Issa in Niger.

each target zone, and we attempt to ascertain whether the intensity of PDEV II activities is associated with stronger or weaker program impact. Second, we conduct analyses of program impact on measures of support for violent extremism that are gauged with innovative "list" and "endorsement" experimental methods designed to overcome potential social desirability biases associated with responses to sensitive questions. Finally, we conducted an extensive series of qualitative interviews and focus groups in order to supplement the quantitative analyses and arrive at a more nuanced understanding of potential program impacts.

B. Description of the Peace through Development (PDEV II) Program

The Peace through Development II (PDEV II) program is a multi-year development program whose main objective is to increase resilience to violent extremism in at-risk communities by empowering youth, increasing moderate voices, enhancing civil society capacity to address community issues, and strengthening local governance in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso. PDEV II was at the time the largest United States Agency for International Development/West Africa (USAID/WA)-funded program specifically designed for this purpose. PDEV II activities are organized and structured to maximize the impact of the program in achieving its purpose. Under the overarching framework of countering violent extremism (CVE) through social and political development, PDEV II has four multi-faceted, strategic objectives (SO):

SO 1: Youth More Empowered through expanded livelihoods, vocational and entrepreneurial skills training, civic education, capacity building for youth associations, and leadership training to increase participation in local decision making by young men and women;

PDEV II activities that support the strategic objective of youth empowerment include: vocational training and the provision of livelihood assistance; literacy training for adults; provision of grants and in-kind resources to community schools; training youth in leadership and the conduct of conflict resolution activities such as participatory theater and media production; and support for community events with youth participation.

SO 2: Moderate Voices Increased through integrated radio, social media, civic education, and conflict resolution activities, enhanced quality and credible information, and positive dialogue;

PDEV II activities that support the strategic objective of increased moderate voices include: Media outlets trained, and assistance provided to radio stations in order to establish or improve broadcast capabilities; the distribution of public information through campaigns; the production of radio shows with themes of peace and tolerance; and the training of imams and the facilitation of intra-faith interreligious dialogue activities.

SO 3: Civil Society Capacity Increased through formal and informal training, strengthened advocacy skills, citizen-led accountability initiatives and issue-based campaigns integrated with radio and social media and enhanced through civil society organizations (CSO) coalitions and networks.

PDEV II activities that support the strategic objective of increased civil society capacity to address community issues include: civil society training; citizen advocacy training, and the formation of Community Action Committees; and support for community events.

SO 4: Local Government Strengthened through organized and enhanced community entities and CSO capacity, greater citizen participation, and training in public administration, transparency, advocacy, and government outreach, and integrated with radio and social media.

PDEV II activities that support strengthening local government include: Local government official capacity building; provision of grants and in-kind assistance to communities in support of development outcomes.

PDEV II seeks to advance these four SO by concentrating its efforts on three more specific and measurable goals:

Goal 1: Improvements in social cohesion through generation of the norms and networks that enable collective action as measured through groups and networks, increased trust within networks and among strangers, increased social inclusion, and improved ability of communities to communicate with each other and with other communities.

Goal 2: Resilience to violent extremism through reduction of risk to vulnerable individuals who could become radicalized to the point of being willing to use violence by strengthening factors that enable vulnerable individuals to resist violent extremism. This includes attitudes toward violence and extremist ideologies, community leadership, social and political engagement.

Goal 3: Improvements in civic outlook through the individual and collective vision of the futures, in outlooks on: economic outcomes, participation in civil society and local decision making, attitudes toward existing and potential conflict in their societies, and expectations regarding the education and learning environment.

The expectation is that furthering these goals would provide the foundation for communities that are more united by tolerance rather than extreme ideology, that are less likely to experience extremist violence, and that provide a more promising future for its members. Taken together, the attainment of these goals would build stronger and more resilient communities, which would constitute a powerful deterrent against violent extremism, extremist ideologies, and support for terrorist groups.

PDEV II conducts a range of activities in order to accomplish the program goals of social cohesion, resilience to violent extremism, and improved civic outlook. Project partners Search for Common Ground, The Salam Institute, and Equal Access subcontract implementation for these activities from IRD.

We will discuss the nature and scope of the PDEV II activities conducted between baseline and endline data collection in more detail in the results (Section III-A) below.

II. Survey Data Collection Overview

This section contains summary details for the data collection periods for the baseline and midline survey data collection, sample characteristics and statistical power for the Midline analysis. Details regarding the survey data collection instrument and enumerator training as well as descriptions of data collection procedures for qualitative and activity tracker analysis are included in Appendix A.

A. Baseline, Midline, and Endline Survey Data Collection

Baseline data collection was conducted in core and non-core zones in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso. In 2013, two surveys were conducted in each country, one by IRD in conjunction with InterMedia, and one by the EAS Team. IRD-InterMedia went to the field for data collection in March 2013 for Chad and Niger, and in September 2013 for Burkina Faso. The first interviews for the EAS Team were conducted in Chad on September 16 and the field period lasted until November 16. In Burkina Faso, the data collection began on September 30 and the field period lasted until October 12. Due to a delay in Niger, the first official interviews occurred on November 10 and the field period lasted until November 30.

Table 2: Summary of Baseline Data Collection

Survey/Country		Date	Zones			# of Interviews		
			Core	Non-core	No Activity	Core	Non-core	No Activity
IRD-InterMedia	Chad	March 2013	7	4	4	560	320	320
	Niger	March 2013	10	7	3	819	561	229
	Burkina Faso	September 2013	6	5	2	481	400	160
			23	16	9	1,860	1,281	709
EAS	Chad	Sept.-Oct. 2013	6	8	1	664	881	110
	Niger	November 2013	5	4	1	551	440	110
	Burkina Faso	Sept.-Oct. 2013	4	6	0	445	669	0
			15	18	2	1,660	1,990	220
Total Interviews						3,520	3,271	929

IRD-InterMedia baseline data collection was conducted in 15 target zones (7 core, 4 non-core, and 4 'no activity') in Chad, 20 target zones (10 core, 7 non-core, and 3 'no activity') in Niger, and 13 target zones (6 core, 5 non-core, and 2 'no activity') in Burkina Faso. The EAS Team baseline data collection was conducted in 15 target zones (6 core, 8 non-core, and 1 'no activity') in Chad, 10 target zones (5 core, 4 non-core, and 1 'no activity') in Niger, and 10 target zones (3 core, 7 non-core) in Burkina Faso. This brings total baseline data collection to 83 target zones (40 core, 43 non-core): 30 in Chad, 30 in Niger, and 23 in Burkina Faso. Table 2 summarizes the baseline data collection timeline, the number of sampled zones, and the number of interviews conducted per country and zone.

The EAS team utilized its Burkina-based partner Centre d'Etudes, de Recherches et de Formation pour le Développement Economique et Social (CERFODES) for data collection, which worked with local partners Association Tchadienne pour l'Étude de la Population (ATEP) in Chad and Cabinet d'Expertise Suivi-Evaluation (CESEV) in Niger. The EAS Team conducted follow-up survey data collection in all 83 core and non-core zones in which baseline data was collected. In all, 2,577 interviews were conducted in the midline phase. Table 3 shows the dates of data collection, the number of new interviews, and core and non-core zones per country.

Table 3: Summary of Midline Data Collection

Country	Date	Zones			# of Interviews		
		Core	Non-core	No Activity	Core	Non-core	No Activity
Chad	March – April 2016	13	11	5	325	274	126
Niger	Aug. – Nov. 2015	15	11	5	489	385	156
Burkina Faso	Aug. – Nov. 2015	10	11	2	353	419	50
		38	33	12	1,167	1,078	332
Total Interviews					2,577		

While baseline data collection totaled 7,720 interviews with an average sample size of 93 interviews per target zone, the midline contained only 25 interviews in IRD zones and 50 interviews in EAS zones due to budget constraints and to optimize statistical power. Due to budget considerations, midline data collection maximized available resources to the extent possible without sacrificing the rigor of the evaluation.

Finally, the EAS team collaborated with CERFODES and its local partners in Chad and Niger for endline data collection. The EAS Team conducted follow-up survey data collection in all 83 core and non-core zones in which baseline and midline data were collected, as well as 2 additional non-activity zones.³ Overall, 7,888 interviews were conducted in the endline phase. Table 4 shows the dates of data collection, the number of new interviews, and core, non-core, and ‘no activity’ zones per country. Endline data collection totaled 7,888 interviews with an average sample size of 95 interviews per target zone.

Table 4: Summary of Endline Data Collection

Country	Date	Zones			# of Interviews		
		Core	Non-core	No Activity	Core	Non-core	No Activity
Chad	April 2017	13	12	5	1,241	1,134	472
Niger	April 2017	15	11	4	1,419	1,056	381
Burkina Faso	March – April 2017	10	11	2	950	1,045	190
		38	34	11	3,610	3,235	1,043
Total Interviews					7,888		

B. Sample Characteristics, Baseline and Endline Surveys

In this section, we present a basic demographic profile of the three countries under study. Table 5 illustrates descriptive statistics for our sample, broken down by baseline/endline survey and non-core/core zone. The table shows that the sample is evenly split between men and women. For gender and age, the differences between baseline and endline survey as well as between core and non-core zones are therefore negligible. Also, baseline and endline respondents exhibit little difference concerning poverty. To measure poverty, we created an additive index denoting how many out of twelve possible

³ Those non-activity zones are Assinet in Chad and Dan Issa in Niger.

household items such as a fridge, TV, and radio respondents have in their household. Baseline and endline respondents exhibit little difference regarding poverty, with respondents owning between approximately three and four of these items. For both the baseline and endline survey, respondents in the core zones are slightly richer than those in the non-core zones. In addition, respondents in the core zones are somewhat more educated (measured as the percentage of respondents who are illiterate, and the percentage of respondents who have at least completed primary education) than those in the non-core zones, a pattern that can be observed for both the baseline and the endline. Overall, then, the baseline and endline respondents are quite similar in terms of basic demographics, with the exception that endline respondents are slightly less religious (measured as the average number of days per week on which the respondent attends religious service) and somewhat more educated. These differences, however, are reflected in both core and non-core zones.

Table 5: Demographic Profiles by Survey and Core Zone Status

	Baseline Survey			Endline Survey		
	No Activity	Non-core	Core	No Activity	Non-core	Core
Male (%)	54.4	52.0	49.9	50.3	50.2	49.9
Age (mean)	34.5	34.0	32.8	33.5	34.4	33.1
Illiteracy (%)	38.4	37.1	33.3	44.7	33.5	28.8
Primary + (%)	19.9	24.5	35.0	23.4	29.3	39.8
Religious attendance per week	5.6	5.0	5.2	4.8	4.2	4.2
Household Items (mean)	2.8	2.9	3.9	2.7	2.8	4.0

C. Statistical Power

For purposes of the evaluation, statistical power refers to the probability that, if the true effect of PDEV II in core zones is of a given size, we will find statistically significant effects on the outcomes of interest. Statistical power is closely related to the sample size and to the number of “treatment” and “control” units included in the study (i.e., core/non-core zones or communes). As the sample size and the number of zones increases, and the lower the variance of the estimated effect of the program, the higher the power. Figure 1 below shows the power that a study design achieves at differing number of clusters (core/non-core zones), at different hypothetical effect sizes (.10, .16 and .25), and assuming relatively large variances within zones on the outcomes of interest. The higher the power, the higher the likelihood of a study uncovering effects when they truly exist in the population of interest. Generally, power of .80 is considered acceptable.




Figure 1: Statistical Power Calculations

In 2017, the EAS team collected endline data in a total of 83 communes (see Table 4 above). A total of 7,888 interviews were conducted with an average sample size of 93 interviews per commune. It can be seen that the desired power of .80 is achieved for the Difference-in-Difference analyses comparing trends over time for core and non-core zones for effect size of .16 or greater. This means that the design we employed will be able to detect with high confidence effects that, according to Cohen (1988), just cross the (.15) threshold from “small” to “medium” size. It also means that “small” effect sizes may exist that could not be detected, given the number of clusters (zones) where the program operated and the number of interviews we were able to conduct per zone. For this reason, we include a category in our tables that corresponds to effects that were “in the intended direction but statistically insignificant”; these effects (color-coded blue in the tables below) should be taken to mean that the program “may” have produced effects that were small in substantive magnitude that our design was not sufficiently powered to detect.

III. PDEV II Program Description

A. PDEV II Program Activities, 2013–2017

We begin by providing information on the number and types of activities implemented in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso as part of the PDEV II program. These figures were obtained from the Activity Trackers submitted by IRD and described in more detail above. PDEV II activity trackers indicate that a total of 1,991 activities were carried out in the 38 core zones surveyed for the endline, which corresponds to an average of about 52

activities per zone.⁴ However, there are some noticeable differences between the three countries in terms of how many activities were carried out in each. In Chad, the mean value of target zone-specific activities in the surveyed core zones is 20, whereas this figure is 33 for Niger, and 73 for Burkina Faso. These figures alone do not tell the whole picture, as at times country programs chose to group multiple interventions as a single activity when working at a national or regional level. Including national and regional-level activities, the mean value of activities in each core zone is 103 for Chad, 226 for Niger, and 182 for Burkina Faso. There are relatively more target zone-specific activities relating to PDEV II strategic objectives #1 (Youth Empowered) and #3 (Civil Society Capacity) compared to activities relating to strategic objectives #2 (Moderate Voices) and #4 (Strengthened Local Government). These differences are generally consistent across the three country contexts.

Next, we break down the scope of the PDEV II by type of activity. The activities carried out through the PDEV II program are classified into twelve different categories. Each of these types relates to one of the four strategic objectives (SOs). Examples of activities listed illustrate the diverse range of PDEV programming:

1. SO #1: Youth More Empowered

1.1. Expanded youth livelihoods

Activities included: Vocational training in construction, bread baking, sewing, driving.

1.2. Increased access to education

Activities included: Youth literacy support, school materials and equipment, library equipment and “Local Heroes” messaging.

1.3. Strengthened youth leadership

Activities included: Training in youth leadership, participatory theater, short film/multimedia tools, mobile cinema, grants for peacebuilding and to support social cohesion.

1.4. Increased youth mobilization

Activities included: Support for mobile cinema, participatory theater performances, peace conferences, and awareness-raising events.

2. SO #2: Increased moderate voices

2.1. Increased capacity of media outlets

Activities included: Radio station equipment and technical support, training in community journalism and broadcasting, SMS and social media training.

2.2. Increased access to quality information

Activities included: Grants for production of radio activities radio program

⁴ Nationwide activities that affect all zones are included in these totals. We code nationwide activities as activities that are allocated to each target zone. Overall, there were 426 national PDEV II program activities.

production retreats, listening club support, public information campaigns, support for girls' access to education.

2.3. Increased positive dialogue with religious leaders

Activities included: Trainings for Imams, Koranic school teachers, and trainings in conflict resolution, civic education support, dissemination of the Koranic School manual, support for interfaith dialogues.

3. SO #3: Increased civil society capacity

3.1. Increased CSO capacity

Activities included: Organizational Capacity Assessment Tool (OCAT) and Community Action Committee (CAC) strengthening, CSO capacity assessment and training.

3.2. Increased citizen participation

Activities included: Grants to support CACs, activities to support CSO civic engagement and mobilization against violent extremism, support for peaceful elections.

4. SO #4: Strengthened local government

4.1. Improved local government capacity

Activities included: Local government capacity assessment tool usage, local government capacity training.

4.2. Increased transparency and accountability in local decision-making

Activities included: public debates, elections education, live radio debates on local governance issues, broadcast of local governance discussions.

4.3. More participatory local development

Activities included: School construction, local development projects, construction of water piping, wells, and storage.

B. Distribution of PDEV II Activities and Resources

Table 6 shows the average number of activities within each category implemented in the core zones, as well as the average dollar amount allocated to each category in the core zones. Nationwide activities that affect all zones are *included* in these totals. We code nationwide activities as activities that are allocated to each target zone.

Table 6: Number of Core Zone PDEV II Activities & Dollar Amounts Allocated to Each Strategic Objective

	Pooled	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso
SO #1: Youth Empowered				
SO #1 Average	51.9 (\$130,850)	25.2 (\$89,430)	64.2 (\$130,670)	68.5 (\$185,227)
1.1 Livelihood	6.7 (\$34,633)	4.2 (\$22,902)	5.5 (\$40,835)	11.8 (\$40,694)
1.2 Education	7.2 (\$50,675)	4.8 (\$39,946)	8.6 (\$44,668)	8.2 (\$73,662)
1.3 Leadership	20.2 (\$20,190)	10.4 (\$12,655)	23.7 (\$21,397)	28 (\$28,231)
1.4 Mobilization	17.8 (\$25,352)	5.75 (\$13,926)	26.5 (\$23,770)	20.5 (\$42,641)
SO #2: Increased Moderate Voices				
SO #2 Average	75.5 (\$65,255)	55.4 (\$57,371)	98.3 (\$82,714)	67.9 (\$49,478)
2.1 Media capacity	30.6 (\$14,809)	18.8 (\$11,035)	40.4 (\$19,261)	31.4 (\$13,091)
2.2 Quality info	24.2 (\$27,600)	19.6 (\$19,595)	30.9 (\$41,017)	20.2 (\$18,018)
2.3 Imam training	20.7 (\$22,846)	17.0 (\$26,740)	27.0 (\$22,436)	16.3 (\$18,369)
SO #3: Civil Society Capacity				
SO #3 Average	24.2 (\$34,723)	13.7 (\$29,079)	30.4 (\$33,166)	28.5 (\$44,423)
3.1 CSO capacity	10.5 (\$14,245)	6.2 (\$14,582)	11.5 (\$11,567)	14.5 (\$17,807)
3.2 Participation	13.7 (\$20,478)	7.6 (\$14,496)	18.9 (\$21,599)	14.0 (\$26,616)
SO #4: Local Government				
SO #4 Average	20.1 (\$47,125)	8.38 (\$18,062)	32.6 (\$81,956)	16.9 (\$33,063)
4.1 Local capacity	7.9 (\$26,073)	1.2 (\$1,219)	11.1 (\$49,365)	11.9 (\$23,750)
4.2 Transparency	11.1 (\$14,146)	6.0 (\$3,434)	20.3 (\$28,267)	3.9 (\$7,047)
4.3 Development	1.1 (\$6,906)	1.2 (\$13,410)	1.1 (\$4,325)	1.1 (\$2,266)

Overall, there were 426 nationwide PDEV II program activities. It can be seen that there are relatively numerous activities relating to strategic objectives #1 (Youth Empowered) and strategic objectives #2 (Moderate Voices), whereas those relating to #3 (Civil Society Capacity) and #4 (Strengthened Local Government) are relatively fewer. For example, in the average core zone, between 10 and 28 activities falling under category 1.3 “strengthened youth leadership” (such as participatory theater and mobile cinema) were carried out. Similarly, the average core zone saw the implementation of between 6 and 28 activities falling under category 1.4 “increased youth mobilization” (such as the provision of sports equipment for municipalities, and youth-led awareness campaigns to promote peace/social cohesion). In contrast, only an average of approximately one activity falling under category 4.1 “improved local government capacity” was carried out in the core zones of Chad, where Strategic Objective 4 activities were reduced to four core zones after Year 3.

C. PDEV II Implementation History

Figures 2-4 below depict the implementation history for Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso by quarter in average dollar amounts (scaled to millions of dollars). Activity expenditures are recorded by averaging allocated funds across the start to end dates reported in the IRD PDEV II activity trackers, and aggregated by Strategic Objective for each country.⁵

⁵ Of the 2417 total activities conducted during PDEV II, there were 50 activities that were misreported in the activity tracker, having start dates that were listed after the end dates in the set. For these activities, the funds were recorded on the earliest date available.

Across the three countries, program activity is limited in Year 1 (quarters 1-4) due to delays IRD encountered in implementing the program, resulting from staff changes and managerial challenges in Chad and Niger.⁶ Program activity increases in the fifth quarter (Year 2, Quarter 1), after staff stabilization was implemented and corrective measures were taken to steer the project toward implementing program outputs. Activities were initiated in Burkina Faso later in Year 2. In all three countries, initial activities conducted related to Youth Empowerment (SO #1), including leadership and participatory theater training and community events.




Figure 2: Average Program Expenditures according to Strategic Objective, Chad

IRD designated 38 zones (14 core, 24 non-core) in Chad for implementation. The operating environment in the country was particularly challenging, as noted in an early PDEV II process evaluation. Factors included considerable staff turnover, weak ties with government agencies and regional technical services outside N'Djamena, long distances between sites, and poor road infrastructure, which limited transfer of equipment and materials and communication between central and satellite offices. These challenges led to minimal program implementation in Year 1. In Year 2 program organization improved and activities relating to Strategic Objective 1 through community events and leadership training; Strategic Objective 2 through Imam training and expenditures on governance radio *Dabalaye* and youth radio *Chabab Al Haye* programs and radio training; and in Strategic Objective 3 as efforts to build Community Action Committees to increase local participation launched in the country. In Year 3, Strategic Objective 3 and 4 programming increased, but was limited to 4 core zones by Year 4. In Year 5, the largest increases in Chad are observed in the Youth Outlook programming, including vocational training, which continued throughout the remainder of the project.

⁶ A detailed record of early implementation challenges and operating environments in the three countries can be found in United States Agency for International Development. 2013. Process Evaluation of the Peace Through Development Phase II (PDEV II) Project. Washington, DC: USAID.




Figure 3: Average Program Expenditures according to Strategic Objective, Niger

IRD designated 40 zones (19 Core, 21 Non-core) in Niger for implementation. In the country, PDEV II benefited from good connections with government agencies through the program’s Country Director and local staff. Challenges included language limitations among key staff, challenges for logistical and financial arrangements that facilitated staff travel and expenses, and a deteriorating security environment, particularly among the border with Nigeria, affecting implementation of activities. Overall there were 40 (19 Core, 21 Non-core) zones in the country. In Year 1, activities related to Strategic Objective 1 launched with mobilization activities including leadership, multimedia, and participatory theater training, followed in Year 2 by steady increases in Strategic Objective 2 through media support and Imam training and in Strategic Objective 4 through community development projects. Expenditures on governance radio *Sada Zumunci* and youth radio *Gwadaben Matassa* increased steadily beginning in Year 2, and continued through Year 5 of the project at a slower pace, as PDEV II inherited better radio infrastructure from PDEV programming compared to Chad and Burkina Faso.




Figure 4: Average Program Expenditures according to Strategic Objective, Burkina Faso

IRD Designated 23 zones (10 Core, 13 Non-core) for implementation in Burkina Faso. The operating environment in the country, by contrast, was more favorable. PDEV II activities benefited from free and developed media, and experienced radio specialists, providing more capacity for PDEV II publicity and radio activities. The program was launched later than Chad or Niger; PDEV II country office set up occurred in summer 2013 and programming began thereafter. In Year 2 activities related to Strategic Objectives 1, launched with mobilization activities including leadership, multimedia, participatory theater training, and community events. Starting in Year 3, the number of these activities increased considerably, in comparison outpacing both the spending level and expenditure increases in the other program areas civil society, media and tolerance efforts, and local governance strengthening. Increases in Strategic Objective 2 activities occurred in Year 4 through expenditures in radio station assistance and media training for youth programs *Malegr Sooré* (Moore) and *Pinal Sukabè* (Fulfulde), public information campaigns, as well as inter and intra-faith dialogues and religious leader training. Activities in Burkina Faso concluded earlier than in Chad and Niger, with program close-out occurring June 2016 (Mid Year 5). With the later start and earlier finish to activities (January 2013-June 2016), Burkina Faso programming was implemented for 3.5 years compared to 4 full years in Niger and Chad (October 2012-October 2016).

What Makes Burkina Faso Unique?

Three factors unique to Burkina Faso suggest possible beneficial effects of program implementation. These include program concentration, additional implementation of Strategic Objective I activities, and geographic concentration of zones in the northern part of the country. Compared to Chad and Niger where activities began late in Year 1 and ended at the conclusion of Year 5, the compressed timing of Burkina Faso non-radio activities may have intensified program implementation. An additional factor in the record of Burkina Faso activities is the larger amount of Strategic Objective 1 activities – Youth Empowered -- conducted relative to other non-radio programming, leading to the

implementation of more livelihoods, peace, and conflict resolution awareness-raising activities and leadership interventions in the country. The geographic concentration of northern core zones in Burkina Faso (see Endline Report Figure 25 on page 71) may have led to coordination benefits from the close clustering of target zones. As noted in the PDEV II Process Evaluation, the diffusion of zones in Chad and Niger led to increased implementation challenges.

IV. Results

A. USAID “Branding” and Public Awareness of PDEV II

This section presents information on local citizens' awareness of USAID's activities in their communities. The conventional practice of marking aid projects with the USAID logo should convey information about U.S. sponsorship and therefore help to improve citizens' attitudes toward the United States. Nonetheless, some individuals in the target zones may be unfamiliar with USAID and its PDEV II program. Those citizens may also be unaware of the United States' efforts to empower youth, increase moderate voices, and strengthen civil society and local government capacity.

To assess whether respondents were familiar with USAID's program, we asked them whether they had ever seen PDEV II's logo. In each country, approximately 25% of all respondents reported having already seen PDEV II's logo. Table 7 shows that respondents were more familiar with PDEV II's logo in core zones than in other zones, especially in Burkina Faso. We also observe relatively similar levels of public awareness in non-core and 'no activity' zones, which indicates that individuals in 'no activity' zones are nonetheless aware of PDEV II's nationwide activities.⁷ In all three countries, and most particularly in Burkina Faso, respondents were more familiar with PDEV II's logo than with the French Development Agency's (Table 8).



Figure 5: The PDEV II and French Development Agency Logos

⁷ Respondents' awareness of PDEV II's logo in 'no activity' zones may also reflect an acquiescence bias. That is, respondents may have claimed to know PDEV II's logo in order to produce a positive impression.

Table 7: Percentage of Respondents Who Recognize PDEV II's Logo

Country	PDEV II			
	Core	Non-core	No Activity	All Zones
Chad	34%	15%	22%	25%
Niger	30%	22%	20%	26%
Burkina Faso	37%	18%	13%	26%
All Countries	33%	18%	20%	25%

Table 8: Percentage of Respondents Who Recognize the French Development Agency's Logo

Country	French Development Agency			
	Core	Non-core	No Activity	All Zones
Chad	23%	19%	17%	20%
Niger	17%	14%	13%	16%
Burkina Faso	9%	5%	5%	7%
All Countries	17%	13%	13%	15%

Figure 6 below shows the percentage of respondents who reported being familiar with USAID's logo in each target zone, ranging from 1% in Melea, Chad, to 66% in Arbinda, Burkina Faso.




Figure 6: Percentage of Respondents who Recognize PDEV II's Logo

B. Difference in Differences Analysis, Core versus Non-Core Zones

This section presents an analysis of the impact of the PDEV II program on a series of outcomes related to the program goals of social cohesion, resilience against violent extremism, and civic outlook. The goals are operationalized according to numerous indicators that, taken together, identify the main components of the program’s strategic objectives.

With a program goal of increased community resilience to violent extremism, our evaluation hypothesis was that a layered number of activities would have an effect on community perceptions that would be detectable in a randomized community-level survey. To test this hypothesis, we conduct standard “difference-in-differences” (DiD) design with regression models estimate the impact of PDEV II programming in core versus non-core zones. This design obtains an estimate of the treatment effect by comparing the average change in outcomes over time for the treatment group compared to the average change over time in the control group. Our difference-in-differences designs compares core-zones to non-core zones to obtain the effect of non-radio programming and non-core zones to “no activity” zones to obtain the effect of radio programming.

“Impact” refers to the differences in responses in the core zones between baseline and endline data collection compared to the differences in responses in non-core zones during the same time period (hence the term “difference in differences” to describe this kind of analysis). For the moment, we ignore differences in the amount of activities conducted across zones (what may be called “treatment intensity”), and focus only on the differences between core zones, those targeted for the full range of PDEV activities, and non-core zones, where at most only PDEV-II radio programming was implemented.

Our analysis proceeds in two steps. First, we present in a figure the distribution of each indicator in the baseline, midline, and endline surveys in core and non-core zones within each country. Next, we present the results of statistical models to determine whether or not there are significant effects of the program on each indicator. These effects are calculated via the difference-in-differences (DiD) approach: we regress goal-level indicators on dichotomous variables for core/non-core zones, wave 1/3, commune-level exposure to violence,⁸ and country, as well as the interactions between these variables. If the program had the intended effects, we would see an improvement in core zones between waves 1 and 3 relative to the trend in the outcome in non-core zones between waves 1 and 3.

In equation form, the DiD model is expressed as:

$$(1) \quad Y_{it} = a + b_1 Core_i + b_2 Wave_t + b_3 Core_i * Wave_t + e_{it}$$

where Y (a given outcome) at a given point in time is equal to: a common intercept or starting point (β), an effect (β_1) of whether the individual is in a core zone or not, an effect (β_2) of a given wave of observation (baseline versus endline) on all individuals, an

⁸ Local exposure to violence, described in the section below, is measured as the number of months with violent events in a target zone between the first and third waves of data collection.

interaction effect (β_3) of wave of observation with core zone status, and an idiosyncratic error term (ε_{it}). For individuals at each point in time, this equation reduces to:

(2) Non-Core, Baseline:	$Y_{i0} = \alpha + \varepsilon_{i0}$
Non-Core, Endline:	$Y_{i1} = \alpha + \beta_2 + \varepsilon_{i1}$
Core, Baseline:	$Y_{i0} = \alpha + \beta_1 + \varepsilon_{i0}$
Core, Endline:	$Y_{i1} = \alpha + \beta_1 + \beta_2 + \beta_3 + \varepsilon_{i1}$

Taking differences means that the non-core zones change over time is represented by β_2 , and the core zones change over time is $\beta_2 + \beta_3$, with the “difference in difference” in the two groups being β_3 . **This coefficient represents the DiD causal effect of the treatment.**

We present the findings for each goal-level indicator exactly in line with these equations. The first row illustrates the average value for the respective indicator in each country’s non-core zones during the first wave of the survey, i.e. before the implementation of the PDEV II program (β). The second row shows the average difference between non-core and core zones for wave 1, and whether this difference is statistically significant (β_1). In the third row, we present the average difference between non-core zones for wave 1 and non-core zones for wave 3, and whether this difference is statistically significant (β_2). This row can be understood as general developments in each country with respect to the indicator in question that are independent of the implementation and effects of the PDEV II program.

The fourth row is the one in which the actual effects of the PDEV II program are shown. Here, we take the difference between wave 3 core zones and wave 1 core zones and subtract the difference between wave 3 non-core zones and wave 1 non-core zones. If the value in the fourth row is statistically significant, it suggests that the change of the indicator in the core zones between waves is significantly different from the change in the non-core zones, which can be attributed to the implementation of the PDEV II program. In addition to the effects for each country, the fourth row also contains a pooled treatment effect, which shows whether the program had a DiD effect when pooling all observations all three countries. For the reader’s convenience, the fourth row is color-coded: coefficients representing a desired effect of the program are shown in green (i.e., effects leading to greater resistance to extremism, more positive outlooks, more social cohesion), whereas coefficients representing an adverse effect of the program (less resistance, less positive outlooks, less social cohesion) are shown in red. Coefficients representing a desired yet statistically insignificant effect of the program are shown in blue.

The models were run first for the pooled sample; that is, combining all countries into a single analysis and estimating the difference in differences for all core versus non-core PDEV II zones, while allowing for country-specific initial levels and overall trends on the outcome between baseline and endline. These results are shown as the “pooled” treatment effect in the tables that follow. We then interacted all of the variables by

indicator variables corresponding to the specific countries so that, in essence, we estimate one model that characterizes the causal processes in the three different country contexts. We present the results of these analyses in separate columns for each country in the tables that follow. Standard errors for all regression coefficients are clustered by target zone, following standard procedures for grouped data of this kind.

The DiD procedure depends on one crucial assumption, namely that the underlying trends on the outcomes would have been the same (“parallel”) in the core and non-core zones in the absence of the PDEV II interventions undertaken in the core zones. In that way any difference in the trends – represented by the DiD coefficient – can be taken as a true program effect, and not simply as the differences in trends that would have existed counterfactually in the absence of program treatments. While this assumption is necessarily untestable with the data at hand, we have reasonable confidence from the baseline survey results that the core and non-core zones were highly similar on nearly all outcome indicators at the outset of the PDEV II program implementation, and thus that there was no overt evidence of factors distinguishing the zones that would have led to differential trends in the absence of treatment.

The Context of Violence within the PDEV II Program Area

The PDEV II program region encountered increased exposure to violence following the baseline data collection wave. According to the Armed Conflict and Local Event Data Project, only Niamey, Niger was exposed to Islamist violence prior to the baseline.⁹ However, by the midline data collection, nearly 20 percent of all communes were the targets of Islamist attacks.

Between 2014 and April 2017, target zones in Chad, Burkina Faso, and Niger were exposed to multiple attacks by Islamist groups such as Boko Haram, Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, and the Islamic State. According to ACLED an overall, 1,340 individuals died as a result of violent Islamist incidents perpetrated in target zones. Nearly three-quarters of those fatalities occurred in the Nigerien cities of Diffa, Bosso, and N'Guimi. While the Islamic State and other groups such as the Al Mourabitoune Battalion and Ansar Dine were active in the region, Boko Haram was responsible for the vast majority of incidents. Most attacks (69%) were targeted at military officials and other security forces, while in 31% of all incidents civilians were the direct targets of the attack. Diffa, Niger (23%), Bosso, Niger (23%) and Bol, Chad (15%) were the three target zones most vulnerable to Islamist attacks.

In Burkina Faso, the cities of Djibo, Markoye, Ouagadougou, and Tongomayel were particularly vulnerable to Islamist attacks. The Al Mourabitoune Battalion backed by Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb attacked military forces and tourists in both Ouagadougou and Djibo, while the Islamic State became active in the border town of Markoye, where they attacked military forces. Another Al-Qaeda-affiliated group, Ansaroul Islam, was active in Djibo, Baraboule, and Tongomayel. Ansaroul Islam conducted attacks against individuals who had deserted the group, including a local imam.

In Chad, more than three-quarters of the attacks that took place between 2014 and 2017

⁹ Armed Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) Project (Raleigh et al. 2010).

were targeted at civilians and security forces in the town of Bol, in the Mamdi Department of the Lac Region. Boko Haram was responsible for all attacks in the city. Boko Haram conducted indiscriminate attacks, including suicide bombings in a fish market and at the Bougama military post. Boko Haram occasionally used children to conduct their attacks against civilians. N'Djamena was also the target of multiple suicide bombings, targeted at police headquarters, the national police academy, but also the central market and most recently the U.S. embassy.

In Niger, most attacks were concentrated in the cities of Diffa and Bosso. In both target zones, Boko Haram was the unique perpetrator of the attacks. The group frequently set fire to victims, homes, and vehicles, as well as markets. The group also resorted to suicide bombers to attack military convoys and other military posts. In several instances, Nigerien troops managed to repel Boko Haram's attacks, and successfully killed several hundreds of the group's members.

Increased exposure to violence, particularly by Boko Haram in Chad and Niger, may affect whether changes in attitudes occurred as anticipated by the PDEV II program. As the security situation deteriorated, worsening of attitudes seen in measures of institutional trust, life satisfaction, and political participation may reflect the context of violence within the affected zones. These challenges may affect the results of concentrating program activities within certain zones within the country where violence was most prevalent.

In order to account for the potential confounding effect of exposure to violence, we include the variable as a control in the difference-in-differences model. We measure exposure to violence as the number of months with violent events in a target zone between the first and third waves of data collection using the ACLED data.

Goal 1: Social Cohesion

Figures 7a through 7b as well as Tables 9 through 12 present the results for the series of questions related to Goal 1: Social Cohesion. Social cohesion is a broad concept that is captured through two separate indicators: 1) interpersonal and institutional trust; and 2) social inclusiveness in the community.

In summary, our DiD analysis reveals that few consistent positive social cohesion effects could be attributed to PDEV II. There was one statistically significant pooled DiD treatment effect across the three countries for any one indicator: institutional trust. Of five indicators of social cohesion, only institutional trust showed DiD effects that could be attributed to PDEV II programming in the core versus non-core zones in Chad, and no DiD effects could be attributed to the program in Niger.

In Burkina Faso, however, the PDEV II program clearly achieved most of its objectives in terms of social cohesion. Of five indicators of social cohesion, four showed DiD effects that could be attributed to PDEV II programming in the core versus non-core zone.

Interpersonal and Institutional Trust (Higher Values Represent Increased Trust)

To measure interpersonal trust, respondents were asked whether they disagree or agree that "most people are willing to help if you ask for help". Figure 7a breaks down responses by country and wave. The figure shows that levels of interpersonal trust remained rather stable in Chad in Niger, while there appears to have been a noticeable drop in

interpersonal trust in Burkina Faso, as more respondents overall disagreed with the statement.




Figure 7a: Interpersonal Trust

Table 9 confirms that overall, there is an intended impact attributable to the PDEV II program in terms of increasing interpersonal trust in Burkina Faso. However, comparing country estimates of the treatment effect in core and non-core zones in Chad, Niger, and the overall pooled treatment effect, we find no statistically significant differences over time.

Interpersonal trust in Burkina has declined between the two waves; this decline is shown by the -.28 significant coefficient in row 3 of the table. However, there is a significant increase in differences in the core zones, indicating that the PDEV II program appears to have offset the decline in interpersonal trust in Burkina Faso. In the other two countries, there were no statistically significant differences over time in either core or non-core zones.

Table 9: Interpersonal Trust

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	2.30	2.33	2.52	X
Baseline Differences (Core vs Non-Core)	.04	-.03	-.25***	X
Baseline-Endline Difference, Non-Core	-.22*	-.09	-.28***	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	.11	-.01	.24**	.10

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
 Intended Effect (non-significant)
 Intended Effect (statistically significant)
 Adverse Effect (statistically significant)




Figure 7b: Changes in Interpersonal Trust Between Waves 3 & 1

Qualitative evidence suggests that efforts to improve interpersonal trust are most effective when they unite different social strata. PDEV II programming in Burkina seemed to be particularly effective in disseminating messages of peace across communities: focus group respondents in Ouahigouya, for example, cite this as one of the strengths of the program. On the other hand, participants in Gorom-Gorom in Burkina Faso and in Niamey, Niger note that activities tended to focus solely on the youth, where interpersonal trust is not in great deficit, but to neglect relationships across age, gender, and employment demographics. Burkina’s longstanding social norm of pairing ethnic groups in teasing relationships (*parents de plaisanterie* in French) may also help to reinforce interpersonal trust there, at least in settings where PDEV II activities serve as reminders of the importance of inter-ethnic cooperation. Without those activities in core zones, however, the declining trend in interpersonal trust is widespread.

Institutional trust is measured through five individual trust items. Each respondent was presented with five separate statements: a) I trust local authorities; b) I trust the central government; c) I trust religious leaders; d) I trust NGOs; e) I trust the police. For each of these statements, they could choose between the options “disagree”, “neither”, or “agree”. Figure 8a graphs the results of an additive index of the institutional trust items. It groups respondents into three categories depending on the number of institutions for which they chose the option “agree”. In all three countries, there appears to have been little change over time.




Figure 8a: Institutional Trust

Table 10: Institutional Trust

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	2.41	2.52	2.64	X
Baseline Differences (Core vs Non-Core)	-.13	-.13*	-.28***	X
Baseline-Endline Difference, Non-Core	-.22**	.08	-.09**	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	.28**	.07	.17***	.19***

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Intended Effect (non-significant)

Intended Effect (statistically significant)

Adverse Effect (statistically significant)




Figure 8b: Changes in Institutional Trust Between Waves 3 & 1

The analyses in Table 10 are based on respondents’ average level of trust across the five institutions. **We find that the PDEV II program had a discernible and intended effect on respondents’ institutional trust.** The standardized effect size is calculated at .33, which suggests that the program had a moderate – i.e., one-third of a standard deviation – overall effect on institutional trust in the pooled samples.¹⁰ In country-by-country analysis, the results show that the PDEV II program has offset the overall decline in institutional trust in two of the three countries. In both Chad and Burkina Faso, there is a significant *decrease* in institutional trust in the non-core zones from baseline to endline. However, respondents in core zones experienced an increase in institutional trust in Chad and a significantly *less pronounced* decrease in institutional trust in Burkina Faso. This means that PDEV II program has achieved some of its goals in terms of institutional trust. However, the table also shows that in Niger, there was no significant difference in the differences in institutional trust.

One explanation for the positive impact of PDEV II activities on institutional trust is the cooperation those programs fostered between community members and local governments. According to one focus group participant in Gorom-Gorom (Burkina Faso): “The PDEV programs have really impacted local governance, and we are seeing the increasing involvement of the population in the political process through awareness

¹⁰ We found that the PDEV II program had an intended and significant effect in Chad, Burkina Faso, and in the pooled analysis when an additive index of institutional trust was constructed that did not include the item “(e) I trust the police.” The pooled standardized effect score calculated for the index excluding the police item is .26.

raising. The population now monitors the actions of their leaders.” In Zinder, Niger, a local elected official had this to say: “Absolutely, they [the PDEV II activities] have made it possible to increase the citizen participation of the populations in the management of the commune.” In Ngouri, Chad, one respondent said the following: “I know the PDEV activities; these activities are effective, because, to be honest, there are many conflicts between young people and in households here. With the activities of PDEV, we observed that the intercommunity conflicts (especially between farmers and stockbreeders) are attenuated. This improved cooperation and increased space for citizen participation in local governance through the PDEV II activities stands out as a particularly important contribution of the program.

Social Inclusiveness (Higher Values Represent Increased Inclusiveness)

One component of social inclusiveness is the involvement of members of the community in decision-making processes. To probe this dimension, respondents were asked to what extent ordinary people from the commune/neighborhood participate when important decisions are being made. As Figure 9a shows, the percentage of respondents who choose the option “a lot” has decreased in all three countries, suggesting a declining sense of involvement in such processes.




Figure 9a: Community Decision-making

Table 11 provides a more nuanced picture of this development. In Chad and Niger, and in the overall pooled treatment effect estimate, the differences between core and non-core, and between baseline and endline are not statistically significant.

Table 11: Community Decision-making

Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled
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				Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.92	2.17	2.35	X
Baseline Differences (Core vs Non-Core)	.06	-.04	-.43***	X
Baseline-Endline Difference, Non-Core	.09	-.04	-.36***	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	-.14	-.13	.35***	.01

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Intended Effect (non-significant)

Intended Effect (statistically significant)

Adverse Effect (statistically significant)

In Burkina Faso, however, responses in core zones show that PDEV II programming offsets the general decline in perceptions that ordinary people participate in the decision-making processes in the community. While we find a significant decrease in perceived influence in community decision making in the non-core zones from baseline to endline, respondents in core zones showed *significantly less negative* changes over time. While they did not have a good explanation for the general decline over time, focus group participants in Burkina stressed that community members, and young people in particular, were frequently invited to take part in local consultations and development meetings as part of PDEV II programming. The effectiveness of this kind of engagement may have offset the downward trends in core PDEV areas of Burkina.




Figure 9b: Changes in Community Decision-making Between Waves 3 & 1

A second component of social inclusiveness is political participation. To measure this

dimension, respondents were asked whether or not they have engaged in any of the following three activities during the past 12 months: attended a commune/neighborhood council or other public meeting; contacted an elected official; notified the village chief about a local problem. Figure 10a graphs the results of an additive index of these three items. It suggests minor increases in political participation in Chad and Niger, but a noticeable decrease in Burkina Faso.




Figure 10a: Political Participation

Table 12: Political Participation

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	.22	.29	.44	X
Baseline Differences (Core vs Non-Core)	-.006	.02	-.08*	X
Baseline-Endline Difference, Non-Core	.003	-.005	-.31***	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	-.04	-.11	.10**	-.02

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Intended Effect (non-significant)

Intended Effect (statistically significant)

Adverse Effect (statistically significant)




Figure 10b: Changes in Political Participation Between Waves 3 & 1

The analyses in Table 12 are based on respondents’ average level of reported participation across the three items. We find that the PDEV II program had a discernable impact on respondents’ level of political participation in Burkina Faso, as there are significant differences in the differences in participation rates over time between core and non-core zones between baseline and endline.

The table suggests a rather low involvement in political activities across all countries. Slight decreases in core zones in Chad and Niger, and in the overall pooled treatment estimate, occurred in statistically indistinguishable ways from changes in non-core zones over time. While there were initially somewhat higher levels of participation in Burkina, this declined between waves. The decline in participation was offset in core zones.

One potential explanation is that a selection effect could be at work, whereby those who invest fully in the PDEV II activities are the type of people who were already inclined to contact officials, engage with chiefs, and attend meetings. If so, this would suggest that PDEV II activities can be successful but that they must target behavior changes among a wider set of beneficiaries. In fact, qualitative evidence indicates that where social cohesion, popular decision-making power, and political participation did not improve in core PDEV zones, the scope of those activities was rather limited. In Tessaoua, Niger, for example, focus groups noted that only small groups participated regularly in the PDEV II activities. This concern was echoed in other zones, as well.

Interethnic Marriage (Higher Values Represent Increased Support)

A last component of social inclusiveness is ethnic bias. To measure this dimension, respondents were presented with the following statement: “I tell my children (or I will tell

my future children) they should only marry people from the same ethnic group as theirs.” Respondents could then choose between the options “agree”, “neither”, and “disagree”. As Figure 11a shows, most respondents disagree with this statement in all three countries, and the percentage who disagree increased from baseline to endline in all three countries as well, suggesting a general increase in support for interethnic marriage (i.e., a decline in ethnic bias).




Figure 11a: Support for Interethnic Marriage

Table 13: Interethnic Marriage

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	2.38	2.67	2.50	X
Baseline Differences (Core vs Non-Core)	-.07	.11	.01	X
Baseline-Endline Difference, Non-Core	.05	.16	.26***	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	.07	-.08	.02	.02

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Intended Effect (non-significant)

Intended Effect (statistically significant)

Adverse Effect (statistically significant)




Figure 11b: Changes in Support for Interethnic Marriage Between Waves 3 & 1

However, as Table 13 illustrates, this general increase is too small to be statistically significant in Chad and Niger. In Burkina, support for interethnic marriage has increased in non-core and core zones alike, which suggests that this positive development was driven by factors other than the PDEV II program.

In summary, of five indicators of social cohesion, four showed intended DiD effects that could be attributable to PDEV II programming in the core versus non-core zones, although almost exclusively in Burkina Faso. Interpersonal and institutional trust, political participation, and perceptions of ordinary people’s involvement in community decision-making declined significantly less in PDEV II core zones in Burkina Faso than in non-core zones from baseline to endline. There is one statistically significant pooled DiD treatment effects across the three countries for any of these indicators: institutional trust.

Goal 2: Resilience to Violent Extremism

Our analysis of Goal 2: Resilience to Violent Extremism is intended to assess whether vulnerable individuals are at risk of becoming radicalized to the point of being willing to use violence. We analyze nine separate indicators for Goal 2, distinguishing between: a) resilience indicators related to expectations of employment, access to vocational training, and political efficacy as factors that enable vulnerable individuals to resist violent extremism; and b) vulnerability indicators related to perceptions of and attitudes toward violence and extremism as factors that make individuals susceptible to violent extremism.

Figures 12a through 20b as well as Tables 14 through 19 present the results for the series of questions related to the concept of resilience. On the nine indicators we analyze, we find a mixed pattern of results. On the three indicators of Community Resilience – access

to jobs, access to vocational training, and political efficacy – we find some evidence of a significant and intended impact of PDEV II program in both Chad and Burkina Faso. On the six indicators of Vulnerability, we find significant intended PDEV II program effects in Burkina Faso regarding the justifiability of religious violence and the perceived effectiveness of violence. The pooled DiD treatment effect for the perceived religious differences was significantly negative (i.e., in the "correct" direction), the only significant pooled effect seen among these nine indicators.

Resilience Indicators (Higher Values Represent Increased Resilience)

To measure respondents’ expectations of employment, they were asked how difficult it is to get a job in their respective country today. Figure 12a breaks down their answers by country and wave. It shows that expectations of employment have worsened somewhat in all three countries.




Figure 12a: Access to Jobs

Table 14: Access to Jobs

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.92	1.56	1.41	X
Baseline Differences (Core vs Non-Core)	-.17	-.06	-.02	X
Baseline-Endline Difference, Non-Core	-.66***	-.28***	-.21***	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	.22*	.02	.02	.11

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Intended Effect (non-significant)

Intended Effect (statistically significant)

Adverse Effect (statistically significant)




Figure 12b: Changes in Access to Jobs Between Waves 3 & 1

Difference-in-difference analysis shows that the PDEV II program had a discernable and intended effect on respondents' expectations of employment exclusively in Chad. The results in Table 14 show changes over time in the core zones that are significantly different from the changes in the non-core zones in Chad, but not in Niger, Burkina Faso, or in the pooled treatment effect estimate. Large declines between baseline and endline in expectations of employment in all three countries are statistically significant. This decline is especially prominent in Chad, where initial expectations of employment during wave 1 were relatively high compared to Niger and Burkina.

A second resilience indicator is Access to Vocational Schools, which was measured by presenting respondents with the following statement: “Vocational school is accessible for people like me.” Respondents could choose between the options “disagree”, “neither”, and “agree”. As Figure 13a shows, the portion of respondents who choose “disagree” has increased by more than 20% in Chad between waves, suggesting a decreased access to vocational school there. For Niger and Burkina Faso, there appears to have been little change over time.




Figure 13a: Access to Vocational School

Table 15: Access to Vocational School

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.91	2.14	2.05	X
Baseline Differences (Core vs Non-Core)	.12	.17	-.24*	X
Baseline-Endline Difference, Non-Core	-.28**	.14	-.32**	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	-.14	-.32	.34**	-.03

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Intended Effect (non-significant)

Intended Effect (statistically significant)

Adverse Effect (statistically significant)




Figure 13b: Changes in Access to Vocational School Between Waves 3 & 1

Table 15 reveals an intended effect of PDEV II activities in Burkina Faso, where we see improved access to vocational school in the core zones relative to the decrease seen in non-core zones. However, we do not find evidence of an intended program effect in Niger, Chad, or in the pooled sample.

Even in the context of positive intended effects in core zones, qualitative evidence suggests that vocational training simply does not go far enough to satisfy the need. In the core zone of Arbinda in Burkina Faso, one youth leader said the following: “The persistent lack of job opportunities for young people in this country is due to the lack of vocational training, and youth are not getting the professional training they need.” In Tillaberi and Tessaoua in Niger, focus group participants indicated that professional and vocational trainings are indeed available, but access is too limited and often people do not take advantage due to lack of information. In Ngouri, Chad, respondents stated the following: “Yes, the PDEV activities have an impact on the life of young people here, but it is just a small portion of the youth. And many of the beneficiaries of this program disappear after the trainings.”

A final resilience indicator is political efficacy. Respondents were asked to what extent they agree with each of the following two statements: a) “My opinions are respected by local leaders.” b) “Local government takes into account the opinions of ordinary citizens.” They could then choose between the options “not at all”, “somewhat”, and “a lot”. Figure 14a graphs the additive index of these two items. Respondents who chose “a lot” for none of the two items are classified as having low efficacy, those who chose “a lot” for one item as having medium efficacy, and those who chose “a lot” for both as having high efficacy. The figure shows no discernable change in Chad and Niger and a rather steep decline in

Burkina Faso.




Figure 14a: Political Efficacy

The analyses in Table 16 are based on respondents' average level of efficacy across the two items. We find a significant intended program effect in Burkina Faso, where the core zones in Burkina declined significantly less from baseline to endline than non-core zones. However, PDEV II program appears to have had a significantly adverse effect in Chad, where core zones declined significantly more from baseline to endline than non-core zones.

Table 16: Political Efficacy

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.82	1.88	2.28	X
Baseline Differences (Core vs Non-Core)	.05	-.01	-.37***	X
Baseline-Endline Difference, Non-Core	-.09	-.07	-.47***	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	-.18*	-.10	.27**	-.03

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Intended Effect (non-significant)

Intended Effect (statistically significant)

Adverse Effect (statistically significant)




Figure 14b: Changes in Political Efficacy Between Waves 3 & 1

Even where the decline in political efficacy was offset by PDEV II activities in Burkina Faso, local structural challenges seem to have tempered the intended impacts. As focus group participants in Markoye explained, elected officials often do respect the opinions of the local population, but advisors and council members do not typically consult villagers prior to their council meetings. As a result, the local residents feel excluded precisely when their opinions might matter most.

In Mao, Chad, one interviewee (a political party representative, accepted that some of the blame lies with local government, which people have difficulty trusting because institutions are not managed with transparency.” However, he also underscored that the influence of immigrants from Libya has introduced a structural challenge in Chadian localities that may be undermining perceptions of political efficacy.

Vulnerability Indicators (higher values represent increased vulnerability)

Unlike other indicators in this report, the vulnerability indicators are coded in such way that *lower values are desirable*, as higher values represent increased vulnerability. This means that normatively desirable PDEV II program effects should be reflected in *negative* coefficients in the following tables.

The first vulnerability indicator is perception of ethnic differences, which is measured by asking respondents to what extent they feel that ethnic differences tend to divide people in their village/neighborhood. Figure 15a illustrates that the percentage of respondents who answer “not at all” has increased in all three countries.




Figure 15a: Perceived Ethnic Differences

Table 17: Perceived Ethnic Differences

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.49	1.40	1.34	X
Baseline Differences (Core vs Non-Core)	.03	.04	.12*	X
Baseline-Endline Difference, Non-Core	-.17**	-.06	-.13*	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	-.08	-.11	-.02	-.07

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
 Intended Effect (non-significant)
 Intended Effect (statistically significant)
 Adverse Effect (statistically significant)




Figure 15b: Changes in Perceived Ethnic Differences Between Waves 3 & 1

Table 17 further breaks down these developments. It shows that in Chad and in Burkina Faso, there was a general improvement regarding this indicator between baseline and endline in non-core zones. However, the absence of significant difference between core and non-core zones is suggestive of a lack of impact of the program in those two countries.

Respondents were also asked about religious differences, i.e., the extent they feel that religious differences tend to divide people in their village/neighborhood. Figure 16a breaks down their responses by country and wave. Similar to the ethnic differences indicator, the figure suggests improvements over time in all three countries, with more respondents answering “not at all”.




Figure 16a: Perceived Religious Differences

Table 18: Perceived Religious Differences

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.44	1.48	1.35	X
Baseline Differences (Core vs Non-Core)	.04	.06	.16**	X
Baseline-Endline Difference, Non-Core	-.16**	-.09	-.09	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	-.08	-.18	-.16	-.13**

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
 Intended Effect (non-significant)
 Intended Effect (statistically significant)
 Adverse Effect (statistically significant)




Figure 16b: Changes in Perceived Religious Differences Between Waves 3 & 1

The perceived religious differences results show the same pattern in Table 18 as was seen for ethnic differences in Table 17: a positive yet statistically insignificant impact of PDEV II activities in all three countries. At the pooled level, moreover, the program does appear to have had an intended effect on individuals' perceptions of religious differences between the first and third waves of data collection, with a pooled effect size of $-.13$. This translates into a *standardized* effect size of $-.197$, or almost a one-fifth of a standard deviation change in this outcome that can be attributable to the PDEV II program. **This is the second of the two significant pooled effects out of the 18 indicators examined in the study.**

Qualitative evidence on these dimensions seems to suggest that local residents have simply been setting aside ethnic differences over time, perhaps as concerns over extremist versus moderate religious differences come to the fore. A traditional leader in Markoye, Burkina Faso indicated that traditional leaders such as himself tend to summon participants in inter-ethnic disputes to resolve their differences before the ethnic differences become an issue. This is a positive development taking place across core and non-core zones.

Religious divides have also not been as salient an issue in the PDEV II region in recent years, though they may lie just below the surface in Chad after long-running Christian-Muslim tensions. There, in Mondo, one resident explained the challenge as follows: "With the extremist trends, everybody is wary about the capacity of interreligious dialogue to establish peace in the society profoundly divided by [religious groups]. For that reason, interreligious dialogue really has to break down barriers." In Niamey, Niger, focus group participants agreed that Islamic Shari'a law should never be imposed where other

religious traditions exist, and in Ouahigouya, Burkina Faso, a civil society leader explained that Muslim and Christian leaders have increasingly made a point of attending one another’s festivals and ceremonies, helping to send a message of inter-religious tolerance. Again, the findings do not suggest that PDEV II programming has been ineffective in terms of minimizing ethnic and religious divides; they only suggest that broader patterns in the region have overshadowed program effects in a positive direction. As a focus group participant in Niamey put it, “decreasing ethnic and religious divisions are a reality here.”

Another vulnerability indicator is the belief in the justifiability of religious violence. To measure this dimension, respondents were asked how often they feel that using arms and violence against civilians in defense of one’s religion is justified. Respondents could then choose between the options “never”, “sometimes”, and “often”. Figure 17a breaks down their responses by country and wave. In the baseline survey, a large majority of respondents in all three countries (> 70%) chooses the option “never”. Over time, the portion of respondents who think that religious violence is never justified has become even greater, especially in Burkina Faso.




Figure 17a: Religious Violence Is Justified

Table 19 illustrates an intended program effect for Burkina, where core zone respondents find religious violence to be less justifiable than at baseline. In Chad a general decrease in the perceptions that religious violence is justified across both core and non-core zones. In Niger, there is a suggestion that respondent perceptions of the justifiability of religious violence declined in core zones more sharply than in non-core zones, though this difference is not statistically significant. Decreases in the justifiability of violence in the pooled treatment effect estimate are statistically insignificant.

Table 19: Religious Violence Is Justified

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.44	1.33	1.26	X
Baseline Differences (Core vs Non-Core)	-.09	.02	.13*	X
Baseline-Endline Difference, Non-Core	-.36***	-.18***	-.13***	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	.13	-.01	-.11*	.01

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
 Intended Effect (non-significant)
 Intended Effect (statistically significant)
 Adverse Effect (statistically significant)




Figure 17b: Changes in the Belief in the Justifiability of Religious Violence Trust Between Waves 3 & 1

Respondents were also asked how often they think violence is an effective method to solve problems. Again, they could choose between the options “never”, “sometimes”, and “often”. Figure 18a reveals that a majority of respondents in each country (> 65%) answers this question with “never”. All three countries exhibit a positive development regarding this particular indicator, with the percentage of respondents choosing “never” becoming greater in Chad, Niger, and Burkina between the baseline and endline.




Figure 18a: Violence Is Effective to Solve Problems

Table 20 shows an intended and significant effect for PDEV II programming exclusively in Burkina Faso. Across all three countries here has been a significant decrease in the perception that violence is an effective method to solve problems. Yet, in Chad and in Niger, this decrease has been happening in both core and non-core zones and can therefore not be attributed to the PDEV II program.

Table 20: Violence Is Effective to Solve Problems

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.45	1.37	1.45	X
Baseline Differences (Core vs Non-Core)	-.10	.04	.16*	X
Baseline-Endline Difference, Non-Core	-.36***	-.26***	-.24***	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	.12	.02	-.14**	.01

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Intended Effect (non-significant)
 Intended Effect (statistically significant)
 Adverse Effect (statistically significant)




Figure 18b: Changes in the Belief that Violence is Effective Between Waves 3 & 1

Next, we asked respondents whether they disagree or agree with the statement that “violence in the name of Islam can be justified”. As with the last two questions, Figure 19a reveals that a majority of respondents in all three countries (> 60%) rejects violence. The portion of respondents who choose the option “disagree” has become greater over time in all three countries.




Figure 19a: Violence in the Name of Islam

Table 21: Violence in the Name of Islam

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.51	1.62	1.48	X
Baseline Differences (Core vs Non-Core)	-.02	-.06	-.07	X
Baseline-Endline Difference, Non-Core	-.31**	-.40***	-.41***	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	.06	-.004	.12	.06

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Intended Effect (non-significant)

Intended Effect (statistically significant)

Adverse Effect (statistically significant)




Figure 19b: Changes in the Belief in the Justifiability of Violence in the Name of Islam Between Waves 3 & 1

Table 21 shows no effect for PDEV II programming. In all three countries, there has been a large and significant decrease in the perception that violence in the name of Islam can be justified from baseline to endline. This decrease has been happening in core and non-core zones alike and can therefore not be attributed to the PDEV II program. Among respondents in core zones, slight increases in justifiability of violence in the name of Islam occur in Chad, Burkina, and in our pooled treatment effect estimate, but these differences are statistically insignificant.

Qualitative evidence generally suggests that—perhaps as their religion has been thrust into the limelight as a result of the increasing number of terrorist attacks—Muslim residents of the study area are renewing their commitment to their religion as one of peace. In Niamey, Tillaberi, Zinder, Ouahigouya, Seytenga, Gorom-Gorom, and elsewhere, focus group participants stressed that Islam is a religion of peace; they used that logic to explain their aversion to justifying violence, to viewing violence as a means of solving problems, and to using violence in the name of Islam. Those trends have increased in both core and non-core zones, which may be a response to terrorist attacks conducted in the name of their religion by a small minority of extremists. As one focus group participant in Niamey said, “Extremists want to rule the world. None of them are religious. Islam is peace, and they make Islam dirty.” This resentment may be driving the positive trends more than PDEV II activities could, though the result is a positive one either way.

A last vulnerability indicator is anti-West attitudes. This dimension is measured by asking respondents whether they disagree or agree with the following statement: "The United

States is at war against Islam, not terrorism.” Figure 20a breaks down their responses by country and wave. In wave 1, a majority of respondents in Chad and Burkina disagreed with the statement, whereas the majority of surveyed individuals in Niger chose to agree with it. In all three countries, the percentage of respondents disagreeing with the notion that the U.S. is at war with Islam has increased over time, suggesting decreasing anti-West attitudes in Chad, Niger, and Burkina Faso. Table 22 shows, however, that those changes are not attributable to PDEV II programs.




Figure 20a: US Is at War with Islam

Focus group and interview evidence seems to suggest that the broader trend in decreasing anti-West attitudes is tied to greater familiarity with terrorist groups acting in the name of Islam: as the aims of those groups are better understood, residents of the region seem to be developing a more nuanced appreciation of the challenges the United States faces. As a focus group participant in Dori, Burkina Faso explained, “Al Qaeda is fighting Western domination and Western culture...and Boko Haram fights against the education of whites.” Another added, “They have been destroying everything from Western people.” In Moussoro, Chad, focus group participants echoed those views: “Boko Haram aims at Africa, but AQIM targets the West.” This perspective suggests that residents are increasingly aware of the threat that terrorist groups pose to the United States, and thus that the US has clear incentives for combatting terrorism that has nothing to do with Islam itself.

Table 22: US Is at War with Islam

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.42	2.23	1.64	X
Baseline Differences (Core vs Non-Core)	.04	.16	-.04	X
Baseline-Endline Difference, Non-Core	-.23**	-.32*	-.31**	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	.04	-.43	-.05	-.03

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Intended Effect (non-significant)
 Intended Effect (statistically significant)
 Adverse Effect (statistically significant)




Figure 20b: Changes in the Belief that US Is at War with Islam Between Waves 3 & 1

To summarize: on the nine indicators related to Resistance to Violent Extremism, we find a mixed pattern of results. On the three indicators of Community Resilience – access to jobs, access to vocational training, and political efficacy – we find some intended changes in Burkina and Chad PDEV II core zones compared with non-core zones. On the six indicators of Vulnerability – questions related to ethnic and religious community divisions, and the justifiability and efficacy of violence – we find intended changes on these perceptions and beliefs in two of the indicators in Burkina. We also find evidence of a moderately-sized significant pooled effect on perceived religious differences.

Goal 3: Civic Outlook

Figures 21a through 25b as well as Tables 23 through 27 show the results for questions related to Goal Level Index 3: Civic Outlook, defined as the individual and collective vision people have about young people in their communities. This concept is operationalized using three categories of indicators: a) *economic outlook* which evaluates attitudes toward and practical vision of future careers and economic potential; b) *educational outlook* which evaluates expectations regarding education and the learning environment; and c) *civic outlook* which comprises engagement in politics, civil society and local decision-making.

Our analysis of Goal 3 Civic Outlook indicators finds a mixed pattern of results for the five indicators. On general life satisfaction and economic perceptions, average responses were worse in Chad though no different in core versus non-core zones, and significantly worse in core zones than in non-core zones in Niger. Political interest increased in Chad and Niger, but without positive differences between core and non-core zones. Although the program appears to have had its intended impact on political knowledge in Niger, there is little evidence of a statistically significant change in political knowledge between within core and non-core zones in the other countries. Furthermore, we do not find evidence of an intended pooled DiD treatment effect between the first and third waves of data collection.

Life Satisfaction and Economic Outlook (Higher Values Represent Improved Outlook)

To measure life satisfaction, respondents were presented with a card showing a ladder representing the “ladder of life”. The ladder consists of eleven steps, ranging from 0 to 10. Respondents were then asked the following question: “Let’s suppose the top of the ladder is the best possible life for you; and the bottom, the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder do you personally stand at the present time?” Figure 21a groups levels 0 through 3 into the category “low satisfaction”, levels 4 through 6 into “medium satisfaction”, and 7 through 10 into “high satisfaction”.




Figure 21a: Life Satisfaction

Table 23: Life Satisfaction

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	4.71	4.22	4.34	X
Baseline Differences (Core vs Non-Core)	-.11	.75***	-.20	X
Baseline-Endline Difference, Non-Core	-.83***	.53**	-.39*	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	.48	-.64**	.40	.08

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
 Intended Effect (non-significant)
 Intended Effect (statistically significant)
 Adverse Effect (statistically significant)




Figure 21b: Changes in Life Satisfaction Waves 3 & 1

The analyses in Table 23 are based on the full range of eleven points. It shows that life satisfaction has decreased over time in Chad but increased in Niger. In Chad, changes in life satisfaction seem to be a general development that is independent of the PDEV II program. In Niger, however, core zones experienced a significantly lower increase in life satisfaction, indicating an adverse impact of PDEVII activities in the country.

To measure perceptions of the economy, respondents were asked whether the economy of their country is worse, about the same, or better than it was a year ago. Figure 22a breaks down their responses by country and wave. It shows that in all three countries, perceptions of the economy have become somewhat more negative. In the endline survey, more than 40% of Chadian said their economy is worse than it was a year ago; in the baseline survey, that figure was only about 25%. The decline in economic outlook in Chad likely reflects the mismanagement of oil revenues that resulted in a broad economic crisis, while respondent's economic outlook in Burkina Faso was almost certainly impacted by the uncertainty over a new political regime.




Figure 22a: Economic Outlook

Table 24: Economic Outlook

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	2.09	2.22	2.21	X
Baseline Differences (Core vs Non-Core)	.02	.08	-.42***	X
Baseline-Endline Difference, Non-Core	-.77***	-.48***	-.56***	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	.01	-.21	.28	.001

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Intended Effect (non-significant)
 Intended Effect (statistically significant)
 Adverse Effect (statistically significant)




Figure 22b: Changes in Economic Outlook Between Waves 3 & 1

Table 24 confirms that perceptions of the economy have significantly worsened over time in all three countries. In all three countries, this development cannot be attributed to the PDEV II program.

In general, macroeconomic trends more powerful and widespread than the PDEV II activities seem to have had a greater bearing on economic outlook in the study region. Turning to the qualitative data, participants in focus groups indeed suggest that access to jobs has become more uncertain; this is true of participants in Gourcy, Ouahigouya, Ouagadougou, Niamey, and elsewhere. PDEV II trainings have been valuable for a number of residents in the region, but those gains are swamped by broader patterns. This is especially true in Chad: residents of Moussoro and other sites stressed that the financial crisis due to the drop in oil prices has had a debilitating effect on the broader economy, irrespective of any local gains from PDEV II activities.

Civic Outlook (Higher Values Represent Improved Outlook)

The last category of indicators we examine in this report is civic outlook. Within this category, we first look at interest in community affairs. This dimension is measured by asking respondents whether they have very little interest, some interest, or a great deal of interest in local community affairs. As Figure 23a shows, the percentage of respondents who say they have “very little interest” in community affairs has decreased over time, whereas the percentage of respondents who choose the option “a great deal of interest” has increased in all three countries.




Figure 23a: Interest in Community Affairs

Table 25: Interest in Community Affairs

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	1.61	1.63	2.08	X
Baseline Differences (Core vs Non-Core)	.07	-.17**	-.29	X
Baseline-Endline Difference, Non-Core	.44***	.55***	.27	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	-.34**	-.28	.06	-.08

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Intended Effect (non-significant)

Intended Effect (statistically significant)

Adverse Effect (statistically significant)




Figure 23b: Changes in Interest in Community Affairs Between Waves 3 & 1

Table 25 provides additional evidence for the observation that there has been an increase in political interest in Chad and Niger. However, in Chad, that increase was more significant in non-core zones than in core zones, suggesting an adverse effect of PDEV II program activities. In Niger and Burkina Faso, this positive development is registered in both non-core and core zones, and thus cannot be attributed to the PDEV II program.

The second component of civic outlook is political knowledge. To measure this dimension, respondents were asked two questions: a) “Do you know how long the term of office is for the President?” b) “Do you know how many seats there are in the National Assembly?” Figure 24a shows the percentages of respondents who gave none, one, and two correct answers to these questions, broken down by country and wave. Political knowledge appears to be highest in Niger, followed by Burkina, then Chad. In all three countries, political knowledge seems to have increased between waves. Again, these findings are consistent with qualitative reports that people in the region, and especially youth, are gaining improved access to information.




Figure 24a: Political Knowledge

Table 26: Political Knowledge

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Treatment Effect
Baseline, Non-Core	.27	.46	.34	X
Baseline Differences (Core vs Non-Core)	.10***	-.07	.02	X
Baseline-Endline Difference, Non-Core	-.02	-.08***	.04	X
Difference in Differences, Core versus Non-Core	-.06	.06*	.05	.04

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01
 Intended Effect (non-significant)
 Intended Effect (statistically significant)
 Adverse Effect (statistically significant)




Figure 24b: Changes in Political Knowledge Between Waves 3 & 1

As Table 26 illustrates, most of the changes in political knowledge in all three countries are statistically insignificant, within core and non-core zones. In Niger, however, core zones experienced a significantly greater increase in political knowledge, which suggests that the program had its intended impact on individuals' knowledge of the political process. Nonetheless, the pooled treatment effect on this indicator is statistically insignificant.

Anecdotally, participants in the PDEV II activities do indicate benefits derived from the program in terms of civic outlook. In Dori, Burkina Faso, focus group participants stressed that the PDEV II activities helped to give them regular access to information about government and political events, which they were not regularly exposed to previously. However, the scope of such impact may not have been broad enough to generate a significant treatment effect in core versus non-core zones.

To summarize: we find a mixed pattern of results for the five indicators of Civic Outlook. On general life satisfaction and economic perceptions, average responses were worse in Chad though no different in core versus non-core zones, and significantly worse in core zones than in non-core zones in Niger. Political interest increased in Chad and Niger, but without positive differences between core and non-core zones. Although the program appears to have had its intended impact on political knowledge in Niger, there is little evidence of a statistically significant change in political knowledge between within core and non-core zones in the other countries. Furthermore, we do not find evidence of an intended pooled DiD treatment effect of PDEV II non-radio programming between the first and third waves of data collection.

C. The Impact of “Low Intensity” Versus “High Intensity” PDEV II Programming

In this section, we present the impact of PDEV II non-radio programming by dividing zones into those in which no activities were implemented, those in which a relatively small number of activities were carried out, and those in which a comparatively high number of activities were implemented. It may be, for example, that significant program effects may be found by examining those zones where more intensive programming took place, and that the null or weak effects found in the previous section may be masking important impacts for the high-intensity core zones of the program. For this distinction, we rely on information provided by the PDEV II activity tracker. Non-core zones are classified as zones in which no activities were implemented. Core zones that received below the median amount of dollars per zone for each country were classified as "low intensity," and those equal to or higher than the median amount of dollars were classified as "high intensity." For Chad, the median amount of dollars per zone is \$113,269; for Niger, it is \$313,313, and for Burkina Faso, it is \$327,533. Figure 25 below shows the distribution of low-intensity and high-intensity zones.

We also used the PDEV II activity trackers to determine the average number of activities organized in low-intensity and high-intensity zones in each country. Table 27 provides information on nationwide and target zone-specific activities conducted in all three countries. It suggests that the average number of activities by low-intensity and high-intensity zones varies by country.

Similar to the models estimated in Section III-C above, these effects for “low intensity” and “high intensity” zones are calculated via a DiD approach: we regress the 18 goal-level indicators on dichotomous variables for no/low/high treatment zones, waves 1/3, exposure to violence, and country, as well as the interactions between these variables. If the program had the intended effects, we would see an improvement in the low treatment zones relative to the non-core zones, and we would see an even greater improvement (or DiD) in the high treatment zones from baseline to endline relative to the changes in the non-core zones between waves.

Table 27: Average Number of Activities & Average Amount of Dollars Allocated to Low- and High-Intensity Zones (Nationwide Activities Included)

	Average Number of Activities	Dollar Amount (\$)
Chad: Low Intensity	123	94,972
Chad: High Intensity	149	280,809
Niger: Low Intensity	221	253,311
Niger: High Intensity	240	401,615
Burkina: Low Intensity	169	226,934
Burkina: High Intensity	194	396,377




Figure 25: Low-Intensity & High-Intensity Zones

Tables 28 and 29 summarize the results of the analyses, which are largely consistent with the results discussed previously. These analyses add nuance to the basic results shown in Section III-C above but do not change the essential contours of the results already presented. **There are few significant pooled cross-country effects: as in the earlier pooled analysis, high-intensity zones with greater amount of PDEV II activities showed greater positive change on institutional trust and perceived religious differences, relative to non-core zones.** In addition, one additional outcome, perceived access to jobs, registered significant effects among high-intensity zones despite having insignificant effects in the earlier pooled analysis. The pooled effects are, moreover, of moderate magnitude, with standardized effects between .20 and .31. Examination of the country-by-country effects showed greater impact of the program in high-intensity zones on a wider range of outcomes, especially in Burkina and especially on indicators of Social Cohesion and Resilience to Violent Extremism. This indicates that zones within Burkina with more PDEV II activities showed the most consistent pattern of positive changes across the 18 indicators. Treatment intensity was less consequential for predicting positive program outcomes in Chad and Niger. In Chad, however, there were anomalous findings where PDEV II high-intensity programming had an adverse effect on a number of indicators: the justifiability of religious violence, belief in the effectiveness of violence, and interest in community affairs.

Table 28: Summary of Results: High-Intensity Programming vs. Radio Zones

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Sample	Standardized Effect Size Pooled Sample
Social Cohesion					
Interpersonal Trust	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.090
Institutional Trust	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect	Intended Effect	.285
Community Decision-Making	.	.	Intended Effect	.	-.096
Political Participation	.	.	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.056
Interethnic Marriage	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.161
Resilience to Extremism					
Access to Jobs	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	Intended Effect	.310
Access to Vocational Schools	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	Intended Effect	.	-.009
Political Efficacy	.	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	-.057
Perceived Ethnic Differences	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	-.150
Perceived Religious Differences	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect	-.203
Justifiability of Religious Violence	Adverse Effect	.	Intended Effect	.	.101
Violence is Effective	Adverse Effect	.	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.077
Justifiability of Violence in the Name of Islam	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	.	.049
U.S. is at war with Islam	.	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	-.066
Civic Outlook					
Life Satisfaction	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.151
Economic Outlook	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.241
Interest in Community Affairs	Adverse Effect	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	-.187
Political Knowledge	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	-.007

Table 29: Summary of Results: Low-Intensity Programming vs. Radio Zones

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Sample	Standardized Effect Size Pooled Sample
Social Cohesion					
Interpersonal Trust	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.062
Institutional Trust	Intended Effect	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.176
Community Decision-Making	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.016
Political Participation	.	Adverse Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	-.168
Interethnic Marriage	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	.039
Resilience to Extremism					
Access to Jobs	.	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	.055
Access to Vocational Schools	.	.	Intended Effect	.	-.005
Political Efficacy	.	.	Intended Effect	.	-.101
Perceived Ethnic Differences	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	.	-.006
Perceived Religious Differences	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	-.157
Justifiability of Religious Violence	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	-.062
Violence is Effective	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	-.028
Justifiability of Violence in the Name of Islam	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Adverse Effect	.	.070
U.S. is at war with Islam	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	-.063
Civic Outlook					
Life Satisfaction	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Adverse Effect	.	.	-.009
Economic Outlook	.	Adverse Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	-.096
Interest in Community Affairs	.	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Adverse Effect	-.352
Political Knowledge	Adverse Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.099

Per Capita Expenditure Difference-in-Differences Results

In order to test the hypothesis that community size played a role in PDEV II impact, we conducted a variation of our high- and low- DiD analysis by comparing the concentration of resources per person in core zones. To assess whether effects were more detectable in smaller communities, given similar investments in programming, we regressed the 18 goal-level indicators on dichotomous variables for no/low/high per capita expenditure zones. Tables showing this analysis are located in Appendix C. Table 30 shows the average population, number of activities, and amount of U.S. Dollars allocated to low- and high- per capita expenditure zones including nationwide activities. Tables 31-2 present the results of these analyses. The results suggest that there are relatively similar program effects between high and low expenditure per capita zones. Consistent with previous DiD analyses in this report, the majority of significant effects are concentrated in Burkina Faso. Measuring intensity of PDEV II program activity better illustrates the effect of varying the concentration of the program resources, as programming priorities adjusted to the community context of violent extremism in the three countries. Perceived need may have led to targeting PDEV II zones with greater program intensity regardless of community size.

Table 30. Average Number of Activities & Average Amount of Dollars Allocated to Low- and High- Per Capita Expenditure Zones (Nationwide Activities Included)

	Average Population	Average Activities	Average Dollar Amount (\$)
Chad: Low Per Capita	133,502	134	1.40
Chad: High Per Capita	67,752	141	3.35
Niger: Low Per Capita	149,751	230	2.45
Niger: High Per Capita	53,784	232	8.52
Burkina: Low Per Capita	128,243	171	2.25
Burkina: High Per Capita	65,983	191	7.33

Note: for the high and low per capita distinction, we rely on information provided by the PDEV II activity tracker. Non-core zones are classified as zones in which no activities were implemented. Core zones that received below the median amount of dollars per zone for each country were classified as "low per capita," and those equal to or higher than the median amount of dollars were classified as "high per capita." For Chad, the median amount of expended per person is \$2.24; for Niger, it is \$4.41, and for Burkina Faso, it is \$3.53.

Table 31. Summary of Results: High-Per Capita Programming vs. Radio Zones

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Sample	Standardized Effect Size Pooled Sample
Social Cohesion					
Interpersonal Trust	.	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	-.069
Institutional Trust	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect	.269
Community Decision-Making	.	.	Intended Effect	.	-.185
Political Participation	.	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	-.133
Interethnic Marriage	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.059
Resilience to Extremism					
Access to Jobs	Intended Effect	.	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.137
Access to Vocational Schools	.	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	-.027
Political Efficacy	.	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	-.171
Perceived Ethnic Differences	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	.	-.117
Perceived Religious Differences	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	-.215
Justifiability of Religious Violence	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	-.103
Violence is Effective	.	.	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	-.025
Justifiability of Violence in the Name of Islam	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	.	.032
U.S. is at war with Islam	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect	-.239
Civic Outlook					
Life Satisfaction	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Adverse Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.111
Economic Outlook	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.089
Interest in Community Affairs	.	.	Intended Effect	.	-.075
Political Knowledge	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect	.	.071

Table 32. Summary of Results: Low-Per Capita Programming vs. Radio Zones

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Sample	Standardized Effect Size Pooled Sample
Social Cohesion					
Interpersonal Trust	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect	.258
Institutional Trust	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.147
Community Decision-Making	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.126
Political Participation	.	.	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.041
Interethnic Marriage	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	-.055
Resilience to Extremism					
Access to Jobs	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	-.138
Access to Vocational Schools	.	.	Intended Effect	.	.024
Political Efficacy	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	Intended Effect	.	.020
Perceived Ethnic Differences	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	-.029
Perceived Religious Differences	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	-.116
Justifiability of Religious Violence	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	.074
Violence is Effective	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	.	.097
Justifiability of Violence in the Name of Islam	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Adverse Effect	.	.102
U.S. is at war with Islam	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.043
Civic Outlook					
Life Satisfaction	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	.174
Economic Outlook	Adverse Effect	Adverse Effect	Intended Effect	.	-.044
Interest in Community Affairs	Adverse Effect	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Adverse Effect	-.436
Political Knowledge	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.063

D. Experimental Evidence

The indicators discussed in the previous sections share the common feature that they all request direct answers or “self-reports” concerning personal perceptions of violence that may occur in their communities, the extremist violence that may occur beyond their communes, and various justifications for using violence to solve problems or in the name of religion. However, researchers cannot often be confident that these types of questions yield honest or externally valid responses from respondents.

The first concern about self-reported responses relates to the honesty of the response. In fact, it is well-known in public opinion and social psychology research that survey respondents tend to answer questions in a way that they believe will please enumerators or, more relevant to this report, provide desirable responses to sensitive items because they conform to a particular set of societal norms. The second concern is the external validity of the response. Are these findings generalizable to political problems in the real world? Because the self-reported items are framed in abstract terms, it is not clear they capture genuine intentions to use violence. That is, such items identify approval of violent behaviors for vaguely-defined circumstances, but they do not measure willingness to support specific violent reactions to clearly-defined policies.

For these reasons, the EAS team devised innovative evaluation instruments that measure attitudes toward violent extremism unobtrusively, that is, minimizing the potential for untruthful answers. These techniques attempt to mitigate social desirability bias and improve internal validity of measures of vulnerability and resilience to violent extremism. They also improve external validity of measures by providing specific and realistic stimuli and relevant violent reactions. By doing so, these items capture the willingness to use violence in concrete, policy-based terms.

List Experiment

The list experiment procedure is straightforward. Respondents are presented with a hypothetical scenario and a series of instructions, read to them by the survey enumerator:

“Imagine that you hear on the radio that a Western newspaper has published offensive images of the Prophet Mohammed committing a crime. You could respond to this affront in many ways. I’m going to read you a list of possible responses now. *Please listen to them and then tell me how many of the following reactions you would support.*”

The sentence in italics represents the core of the list experiment because respondents are instructed to reveal only the number of responses they would support but not which responses they would support. Half of the respondents in a given target zone were randomly assigned to a “control group” to whom the survey enumerator lists only three potential responses:

- 1) A peaceful protest at the Western country’s embassy;
- 2) Your government demands an apology from the Western country;
- 3) Your government declaring war against the Western country.

Responses 1-2 are likely unobjectionable. The third item is designed to be more radical so that that most respondents do not necessarily respond affirmatively to all three control items. This is referred in the literature as a ceiling item or a low-prevalence item that

minimizes design effects when comparing control and treatment groups. The other half of respondents in a target zone were randomly assigned to a “treatment group,” to which the survey enumerator lists the three potential responses listed above as well as a fourth, sensitive item:

4) An attack on the Western country’s embassy that could result in military or civilian casualties.

Again, respondents only reveal the total number of potential responses to the hypothetical scenario that they would support and they do not reveal to the survey enumerator which ones. Assuming that the randomization process for assigning treatment and control groups was effective, the difference between the average number of items that respondents in the treatment group report and the average number of items that respondents in the control group report, therefore, yields a measure of the percentage of the sample that agrees that "An attack on the Western country's embassy that could result in military or civilian casualties" is an appropriate response to the publication of an offensive image of the Prophet Mohammed.

For our analyses of the list experiment, we model the respondent's answer as a linear function of his/her treatment assignment and the control covariates. These OLS regressions predict the count of violent acts provided by respondents with a dichotomous variable that indicates whether or not the respondent received the sensitive item (attacking the embassy). Under the conditions of randomization, the treatment groups and control groups are equally likely to support all three non-sensitive items. Given that the groups are identical in every measure except for the addition of a fourth item on the list, any differences between the groups may be attributed to the addition of the sensitive item. Specifically, differences between the groups may be interpreted as the proportion of respondents who support an attack on an embassy that may result in military or civilian casualties. This difference between the treatment and control groups is referred to as the "average treatment effect."

Table 33. List Experiment – Percentage of Respondents Who Support an Attack

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled
Endline, Non-core	21.3***	8.6	3.7	13.0***
Endline, Core	22.9***	5.7**	5.8	12.3***

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

First, we analyze the responses by all individuals interviewed during the third wave of the survey. The results are shown in Table 33, broken down by country and zone type. The first row shows the proportion of respondents in non-core zones who support an attack on an embassy that may result in military or civilian casualties, and whether this number is significantly different from zero. In Chad, a significant portion of respondents in non-core zones supports such an attack (21%). In the pooled sample, 13% of all respondents support an attack in non-core zones. The second row shows the proportion of respondents in core zones who support an attack on an embassy that may result in military or civilian casualties. In both Chad and Niger, as well as in the pooled sample, a significant proportion of all respondents supports such an attack. In all samples, however, the differences between core and non-core zones are insignificant.

Second, we analyze and compare the changes in baseline and endline responses among individuals *only* in EAS zones, following the difference in difference logic utilized to estimate PDEV II program effects in earlier portions of the report. The reason we restrict this analysis to respondents who are residing in a zone that was part of the baseline EAS survey is that during the baseline wave, respondents in zones surveyed by IRD were not asked the questions relating to the experiments. Therefore, it was not possible to measure *changes* among IRD zones from baseline to endline, nor to link these changes to core versus non-core PDEV II status.

Table 34. List Experiment #1 – Percentage of Respondents Who Support an Attack

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled
Baseline, Non-core	10.9*	5.7*	1.8	6.2
Baseline, Core	7.9	9.3*	10.2	9.0**
Endline, Non-core	15.3	1.4	4.5	10.4*
Endline, Core	20.8**	4.6	.06	9.9**
Program Difference-in-Difference Effect	No Significant Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 34 illustrates the results of the analysis of EAS zones over time. In non-core zones, the proportion of respondents who support such an attack has increased over time, particularly in Chad with a 4 percentage-point increase between baseline and endline. In core zones, the proportion of respondents who support such an attack has decreased in both Niger and Burkina Faso. Comparing the evolution of individuals' responses in core and non-core zones allows us to determine whether the program has been successful in reducing their support for terrorist violence. In all three countries, no significant program effect is detected. However, in Niger and Burkina Faso, the program did appear to have had an intended, yet statistically insignificant, impact on individual support for an Islamist attack. Figure 26 shows the evolution of individuals' support for an attack in all three countries.




Figure 26: List Experiment #1 – Percentage of Respondents Who Support an Attack

Endorsement Experiment

We also implement an endorsement experiment that measures support for two extremist groups: Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM) and Boko Haram. The endorsement experiment follows a similar structural logic as the list experiment, though its aim is to measure sympathy with active radical and extremist groups in the region, as opposed to approving of extremist violence (Bullock et al. 2011).

For our endorsement experiment, respondents are randomly assigned to receive one of two prompts. In the control condition, the survey enumerator reads:

“The World Health Organization recently announced a plan to introduce universal Polio vaccinations across {Burkina Faso/Chad/Niger}. How much do you approve of such a plan – not at all, somewhat, or quite?”

Treatment subjects, by contrast, encounter one additional detail: they learn that an extremist group opposes the World Health Organization’s plan. Approximately half of the respondents in the treatment groups learn about Boko Haram opposition to the program (endorsement experiment #1a):

“The World Health Organization recently announced a plan to introduce universal Polio vaccinations across {Burkina Faso/Chad/Niger}. **It is likely that Boko Haram, an Islamist group, will oppose this program.** How much do you approve of such a plan – not at all, somewhat, or quite?”

The other half of the respondents in the treatment groups learn about Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb’s opposition to the program (endorsement experiment #1b):

“The World Health Organization recently announced a plan to introduce universal Polio vaccinations across {Burkina Faso/Chad/Niger}. **It is likely that Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM), an Islamist group, will oppose this program.** How much do you approve of such a plan – not at all, somewhat, or quite?”

The baseline expectation is that individuals in the treatment group who sympathize to some extent with Boko Haram/AQIM will be more likely than individuals in the control group to oppose the WHO program.

Table 35 displays the percentage of all endline respondents who report disapproving of the nation-wide vaccination program for experiments #1a and #1b, respectively. For each experiment, the control group contains the individuals who evaluate the vaccination program on its own, with no group endorsement heuristic. Of these individuals, opposition to the program ranges from 11% in non-core zones in Burkina to 43% in core zones in Chad. The treatment group contains individuals who evaluate the vaccination program with the additional knowledge that an extremist group opposed the program. Of these individuals, opposition to the program ranges from 33% in core zones in Burkina to 71% in non-core zones in Chad.

Table 35: Percentage of Endline Respondents Who Support an Extremist Group

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled
Endline, Non-core: Support for Boko Haram	27.2***	37.2***	13.0*	25.3***
Endline, Core Support for Boko Haram	21.7***	24.6***	21.7***	22.4***
Endline, Non-core Support for AQIM	38.0***	30.2***	23.0**	30.9***
Endline, Core Support for AQIM	32.8***	21.0***	13.4*	23.6***

* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Since the baseline survey already included an endorsement experiment measuring levels of support for AQIM, we also analyze the evolution of individuals’ support for AQIM between the first and final waves of data collection. We analyze and compare the changes in baseline and endline responses among individuals *only* in EAS zones, following the difference in difference logic utilized to estimate PDEV II program effects in earlier portions of the report. The reason we restrict this analysis to respondents who are residing in a zone that was part of the baseline EAS survey is that during the baseline wave, respondents in zones surveyed by IRD were not asked the questions relating to the experiments.

Table 36: Endorsement Experiment – Percentage of Respondents Who Support AQIM, Baseline to Endline

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled
Baseline, Non-core	11.4**	25.5***	22.0***	17.7***
Baseline, Core	16.9**	23.7***	21.9**	20.4***
Endline, Non-core	45.9***	28.6***	16.0	32.8***
Endline, Core	27.3**	21.1**	7.3	20.4***
Program Difference-	Intended Effect	Intended Effect	Intended Effect	Intended Effect

in-Difference Effect	(non-significant)	(non-significant)	(non-significant)	(non-significant)
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* p < .10; ** p < .05; *** p < .01

Table 36 illustrates the results of the analysis of EAS zones over time. In non-core zones, levels of support for AQIM has increased in Niger and Chad, with a 35 percentage-point increase in the latter country. In Burkina Faso, levels of support for AQIM decreased in non-core zones. In core zones, levels of support decreased significantly in Burkina Faso, decreased in Niger, and increased in Chad. **Changes in the levels of support for AQIM in any of the countries cannot be attributed significantly to PDEV II activities, but the pattern does indicate that the trends in all countries were in the intended direction: in Chad the increases in support for AQIM in core zones were less than in non-core zones, and the Niger and Burkina the decreases in support for AQIM were sharper in core-zones than in non-core zones. The difference-in-difference proportions attributable to the program were approximately 15% in the pooled analysis, though again this figure was not statistically significant.** Figure 27 below shows the evolution of individuals' support for AQIM in all three countries between the first and the final waves of data collection.




Figure 27: Endorsement Experiment #1b—Percentage of Respondents Who Support AQIM, Baseline to Endline

E. Impact of Radio Programming

This section evaluates the impact of the radio component of PDEV II in relation to the program's stated goals. To assess the effectiveness of radio programming, we identify "difference-in-differences" (DiD) in radio programming outcomes. In other words, we compare the changes in program-relevant outcomes in 'non-core zones', which received

only the program's media treatments, with changes in program-relevant outcomes in 'no activity zones', which were not exposed to PDEV II radio programming. The DiD represents the estimated effect that can be attributed to the non-radio portion of PDEV II programming. Table 37 below presents the impact of radio programming for each indicator.

Since radio programming is a component of the overall PDEV II set of activities, intended outcomes for the radio are more narrowly defined than the broad goals of the full range of interventions. The primary intended goals of the program, according to program documents, is to encourage listeners to "explore peaceful ways to address grievances, teach skills needed to constructively engage authorities, and address the causes and consequences of religious extremism."¹¹

Governance radio programs *Sada Zumunci* (Chad), *Dabalaye* (Niger) themes focused on: decentralization, human rights, national stability, nonviolence, participation, pluralism, refugee reintegration, social development, and tolerance and diversity. Youth radio programs *Chabab Al Haye* (Chad), *Gwadaben Matassa* (Niger), in Burkina Faso *Malegr Sooré* (Moore) and *Pinal Sukabè* (Fulfulde) themes focused on: community safety, drug use human rights, social and family cohesion, personal conflict, political engagement, professional development, women's empowerment, youth roles and independence, youth mobilization, and youth violence.

While programming changes occurred to the radio program format over time, introducing radio drama episodes to incorporate narratives and supplement the traditional magazine shows, PDEV II continually supported radio stations by equipment, technical assistance, and training of their staff and journalist-producers of the radio program. To encourage listenership, PDEV II encouraged the formation of listening clubs to meet regularly to listen to the radio shows and discuss their themes, and obtained listener feedback through the Frontline SMS system.

The results of the pooled analyses indicate that zones that were exposed to PDEV II radio programming experienced significantly higher perceptions of inclusiveness in community decision-making, and significantly higher levels of political efficacy, as well as lower levels of support for the justifiability of religious violence and perception that violence is effective to solve problems. These were arguably the indicators that the PDEV II radio programming was designed in particular to influence. These standardized effects were of moderate magnitude, with standard deviation changes of .34 and .45, respectively. To this extent, the radio portion of PDEV II should be viewed as a qualified success. On all other indicators, however, there were insignificant DiD effects of PDEV II radio programming.

¹¹ International Relief and Development. 2012. *PDEV II Year 2 Work Plan*. Washington, DC: USAID.

Table 37: Radio Programming Effects

	Pooled Sample	Standardized Effect Size Pooled Sample
Social Cohesion		
Interpersonal Trust	.	-.013
Institutional Trust	.	-.044
Community Decision-Making	Intended Effect	.452
Political Participation	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.082
Interethnic Marriage	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.039
Resilience to Extremism		
Access to Jobs	Adverse Effect	-.255
Access to Vocational Schools	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.007
Political Efficacy	Intended Effect	.343
Perceived Ethnic Differences	.	.163
Perceived Religious Differences	.	.210
Justifiability of Religious Violence	Intended Effect	-.232
Violence is Effective	Intended Effect	-.211
Justifiability of Violence in the Name of Islam	Intended Effect (non-significant)	-.066
U.S. is at war with Islam	Intended Effect (non-significant)	-.242
Civic Outlook		
Life Satisfaction	.	-.211
Economic Outlook	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.166
Interest in Community Affairs	.	-.229
Political Knowledge	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.072




Figure 28: Changes between Waves 1 & 3: Interpersonal Trust, Institutional Trust, Community Decision-Making, Political Participation




Figure 29: Changes between Waves 1 & 3: Interethnic Marriage, Access to Jobs, Access to

Vocational Schools, Political Efficacy




Figure 30: Changes between Waves 1 & 3: Violence in the Name of Islam, Anti-West Attitudes (U.S. Is at War With Islam), Life Satisfaction, Economic Outlook




Figure 31: Changes between Waves 1 & 3: Perceived Ethnic Differences, Perceived Religious Differences, Justifiability of Religious Violence, Violence is Effective




Figure 32: Changes between Waves 1 & 3: Interest in Community Affairs, Political Knowledge

V. Observations from Qualitative Data

This section outlines some common themes from the qualitative data collected by CERFODES in Burkina Faso, CASPA in Niger, and ATEP in Chad. It is difficult to summarize the qualitative evidence in a concise manner since many opinions were expressed on a range of topics, but a number of noteworthy themes stood out.

PDEV II Exposure and Impact

Across the three countries, interview and focus group participants provided a high level of satisfaction with the program. Participants often expressed positive impact from the PDEV II activities regarding bringing community members together in dialogue and also in terms of concrete vocational skills transmission such as welding and sewing.

Participants found that efforts to generate community awareness, sensitization, and provide public dialogues, though means such as through participatory theater, leadership training, and youth involvement in local politics, reinforced social cohesion.

- A traditional chief in Markoye described the positive effect of sensitization on interest in community affairs:

“PDEV programs are effective because their awareness raising has helped to inform the minds of the population. We saw during the PDEV activities that the theater brought together many young people, women and local elected officials who were very interested because these plays highlighted what they are doing.”

- An Imam in Markoye described the increases in public knowledge that resulted from participatory theater participation:

“There was a significant change because the theater reflected the reality of things that the population did not know. The PDEV has come to light the knowledge of the community.”

- A youth leader in the Arbinda, Burkina Faso noted the role playing conducted in theater exercises provided positive examples for reconciliation:

“Theatrical performances were performed in a village where two councilors did not speak. But after the play the two councilors reconciled. The play was about the

disagreement of political actors."

- A youth leader who participated in training in Niamey described the personal effect of leadership training attitudes toward resilience:

"We are about twenty who have received training in leadership, non-violent conflict management, project planning, mapping to the development department. We also participated in participatory theater." "These formations have shaped me, I was belligerent, but with these formations I knew that communication is good."

- A youth focus group member in Tillaberi, Niger commented on the increase in youth visibility in local governance:

"A big change happened in local governance. Before, we (the youth) weren't involved but thanks to PDEV we are seen."

- An Imam in Ngouri, Chad noted improved cohesion within and between communities, reducing conflict:

Yes, I know the PDEV activities; these activities are effective, because without sensitizing there are many conflicts between young people and in household. With the actions of PDEV, we observed that the intercommunity conflicts (farmer-stockbreeders) are attenuated.

This positive effect was also found in livelihood support, through vocational training. In Zinder, Niger focus group respondents identified PDEV II activities including vocational training that supported career development in sewing, mechanics, and plumbing.

- A traditional chief in Markoye, Burkina Faso noted the impact on youth and young women:

"The activities of the PDEV have had an impact because some young people have attended vocational training organized by PDEV. Today these young people manage to take care of themselves. There are also girls who have been trained and today they have become dressmakers and take charge."

- These effects were observed in Mao in Chad as well, where a political party representative noted that:

"Certain young people gave up drugs and made small income generating activities, and women organize themselves to undertake small activities to help their husbands in their household."

Effects of Radio Listenership

Respondents agreed that PDEV II radio programming permitted the broad dissemination of messages of peace and tolerance across the three countries. Radio also increased community engagement, bringing individuals together through listening clubs.

- In Agadez, Niger, a youth leader interviewed found the positive effects of PDEV II radio programming to be related to cohesion and community engagement:

"They have a real impact because they promote cohesion through the mixing of the different fadas of the young people of Agadez. They create and organize young people into networks of friends. They raise awareness of peace, tolerance, civil

rights, violence, early marriage, women's rights and many other things about the life of the community.”

- Focus group participants in Ouahigoya found the programming supported cohesion:

"The program *Malegr Sooré* has served us well at the social level by raising awareness of entrepreneurship and the culture of tolerance." Focus group members also noted their own participation in a listening club.

- In Moussoro, Chad, an Imam identified the governance radio program Dabalaye as effective, but also assigned sensitization roles to other media outlets in the country:

"It is in particular *Dabalaye* emissions which is essential for peace and tolerance. These programs are effective. The national radio must sensitize people also much on the culture of peace and tolerance between sons of this country."

However, radio programming was not available across the entire PDEV II area. Respondents noted challenges with signal coverage and support for service to equipment.

- Focus group respondents in Michermiré, Chad, acknowledged that they could not access the signal for PDEV II radio programs:

"We do not follow radio programs because radio stations created by PDEVII in Mondo and Moussoro do not cover all the area of Michermiré, otherwise it was going to change the behavior of young people of our locality."

- In Ouahigoya, Burkina Faso, a radio broadcaster noted that radio equipment to be donated took a long time and some places benefited more than others, causing frustration:

"We received support from PDEV II for the repair of our radio transmitter, but we were waiting for other equipment that was also planned that we did not receive until the end of the program."

Access to PDEV II Programming

Routinely, participants stressed that the PDEV II activities reached too small a group of beneficiaries. Critical perspectives on the accessibility of PDEV II programming included: the restriction of access due to the youth focus, challenges reaching rural areas, and translation into local languages.

- Focus group respondents in Gorom-Gorom, Burkina Faso found that opportunities were limited because they were targeted "towards youth" and "did not involve all social strata." In Agadez, a youth leader interviewed remarked that in a limited information environment for youth, participation in PDEV II programs became a matter of networks of parents, friends, and acquaintances and that "not even the young people of the locality in the majority who get to have access."
- Women in Chad and Niger identified access challenges for PDEV II programming. A women's focus group in Maradi, Niger PDEV noted that while PDEV II activities help reduce poverty, the "benefits are for a few persons only." Respondents in

N'Djamena and Moussoro, Chad concluded that PDEV II programming does not include activities for women.

- In Burkina Faso, women identified avenues for participation and positive effects from PDEV II. In Gourcy a women's focus group identified a sensitization activity on the role and place of women in society, and the development of an inter-religious cultural event that was considered to be successful in increasing cohesion among women of different religions. In Seytenga, women identified increased involvement of women and youth in politics as a result of programming.
- Recognizing the geographic challenges in Chad, focus groups of rural town and village residents credited the beneficial effects of PDEV II sensitization, but raised concerns related to carrying out sensitization activities in rural areas. In the town of Moussoro, respondents expressed concern regarding the scale of sensitization needed to reach rural areas. In the village of Michemiré, the respondents noted:
"The sensitization, the elimination of illiteracy and other developed activities have a positive impact but a lot rest to be made because a large part of villages did not benefit from these activities in particular in rural areas. The activities of PDEVII are much more developed in urban zones than in rural areas."
- Part of the limited reach may have related to translation of programming into local languages. In Tillaberi, Niger focus group respondents recommended translating sensitization and awareness raising into local dialects. Focus group respondents in Gorom-Gorom, Burkina Faso noted that radio broadcasts were not available in all languages.
- Focus group participants in Tillaberi recommended limiting the participation age up to 40 years to enable individuals to reach the program.

PDEV II Follow Up and Sustainability

Interview and focus group participants raised concerns regarding the sustainability of PDEV II activity and follow-on from training and assistance. Respondents critically considered the ways in which the program linkages were established with national and local governments.

- A woman's association leader in N'Djamena made suggestions to improve the linkages between the vocational training and local employment environment, including: extending vocational training in other locations and to revising the duration of training (3 to 6 months instead of 45 days), and proposing to local companies to employ young people beneficiary of training course.
- A radio broadcaster in Ouahigoya, Burkina Faso noted a role for the national government in continuity of sensitization activities:
"For these kinds of programs, it is to work to ensure that there is a real complicity between the program and the line ministries, that is, the responsibility of the State to have a follow-up because there was enough experience to continue as it is doing well in the country. We must, therefore, consider the sustainability of these types of programs."

- Focus group respondents in Mao, Chad expressed interest in donor support to continue ongoing work:
 “We wish that PDEV II helps us to finalize the ongoing activities, to continue to train religious (imams, ministers, priests), and to widen the field of sensitization, because the objectives are not to fully affected and finally to strengthen the income generating activities and to structure youth associations.”
- Separately this group identified that there were a lack of follow up measures of support after sensitization relating to drug consumption. In N’Djamena, a Women’s Association Leader suggested grants to publicize PDEV activities, noting that the Community Action Committee board did not have a way to popularize a peace campaign begun under PDEV II.
- Changes in implementation were perceived negatively when individuals felt the need for programming. A Women’s Association Leader in Ouagadougou expressed concern:
 “Before there were these kinds of programs. There were programs on poetry, recitations to promote peace, but it did not last. Borough 4 is a hot borough, a borough that is experiencing difficulties. We need to do forum theaters, awareness programs to get people to change.”

Community Perceptions of Violent Extremism and Resilience

Individual interviews and focus groups presented a nuanced understanding of the increase in violent extremism among communities though were careful to note frustrations relating to limited economic opportunity and shortcomings in governance that posed challenges to improving community resilience.

Participants frequently mentioned the lack of jobs and opportunities for youth as a debilitating factor at the local level, and one that can potentially contribute to division and extremism.

Opinions also differed regarding local governance and the place of community members in the governing process. Leaders in interviews often noted that they listen to the voices of community members, but both leaders and focus group participants recognized that shortcomings in transparency can frustrate the population.

In conversations regarding the relationship between Islam and extremist violence, focus group participants and religious leaders in interviews regularly stressed that Islam is a religion of peace and that violence is not justifiable in the name of the religion. This often came unprovoked and as a sort of defense against the perspective that extremist groups somehow represent the religion. Opinions were quite varied regarding the place that Shari’a Law does and should play in society, though it was not uncommon for participants to stress that Shari’a is often misinterpreted and can be a valuable source of stability for communities.

Participants expressed a fairly nuanced perspective on the rise in extremist violence that has taken place over the past few years. Many recognized differences between Boko Haram and Al Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb, the former tending to target local Africans and the latter focused more on Western interests.

Women participants and leaders frequently noted that they are capable and willing to participate in community peacebuilding, and many spoke highly of PDEV II activities in terms of strengthening these capacities. However, a constant refrain was that women remain constrained by the strong influence of men over household and community decisions.

VI. Conclusion

We summarize the results of the main quantitative analyses in Table 38. As in previous tables, we show intended effects of the program, i.e., in line with PDEV II program goals, in green, and adverse effects in red. Coefficients representing a desired yet statistically insignificant effect of the program are shown in blue.

Table 38: Summary of Results: Difference-in-Difference (DiD) Analysis

	Chad	Niger	Burkina Faso	Pooled Sample	Standardized Effect Size Pooled Sample
Social Cohesion					
Interpersonal Trust	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.119
Institutional Trust	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect	Intended Effect	.330
Community Decision-Making	.	.	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.011
Political Participation	.	.	Intended Effect	.	-.054
Interethnic Marriage	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.028
Resilience to Extremism					
Access to Jobs	Intended Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.148
Access to Vocational Schools	.	.	Intended Effect	.	-.037
Political Efficacy	Adverse Effect	.	Intended Effect	.	-.045
Perceived Ethnic Differences	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	-.106
Perceived Religious Differences	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect	-.197
Justifiability of Religious Violence	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect	.	.022
Violence is Effective	.	.	Intended Effect	.	.008
Justifiability of Violence in the Name of Islam	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	.	.076
U.S. is at war with Islam	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	-.035
Civic Outlook					
Life Satisfaction	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Adverse Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.042
Economic Outlook	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	-.001
Interest in Community Affairs	Adverse Effect	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.	-.097
Political Knowledge	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Adverse Effect	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	.103
Experimental Evidence					
Supports Attack with Potential Civilian Casualties	.	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	-3.3% support
Supports Islamist Group	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	Intended Effect (non-significant)	-15.1% support

The results may be summarized as follows:

An examination of the country-specific effects showed numerous impacts of the program, especially in Burkina Faso (see Section III-C). Significant DiD estimates of positive, non-radio program impact were noted on eight indicators in Burkina Faso, four of which related to Program Goal 2, Resilience to Violent Extremism: access to vocational schools, political efficacy, reduced belief in the justifiability of religious violence, and reduced belief in the effectiveness of violence. Burkina core zones also increased more than non-core zones on interpersonal trust, institutional trust, perceptions of the inclusiveness of community decision-making, and political participation.

There were few significant DiD impacts in Chad or Niger (see Section III-C), with two significant intended impacts for core zones differences relative to non-core zones in Chad (institutional trust, access to jobs), and one in Niger (political knowledge). PDEV II activities also appear to have had two adverse effects in Chad (reduced political efficacy and reduced interest in community affairs) and Niger (reduced life satisfaction). Though these adverse effects are observed in the analysis, the mixed pattern of results in the two countries suggests a null finding on the effects of the program for both at the country level. Taken in consideration with the mix of few significant intended effects, and an even amount of nonsignificant intended and unintended results, the overall picture suggests no detectable general difference across the two countries resulting from non-radio PDEV II programming.

When outcomes were pooled across all three countries, there were only two indicators of the 18 analyzed in which a statistically significant pooled intended effect of core zone versus non-core zone status was found (see Section III-C). Intended pooled DiD effects were found on institutional trust and the perception of religious differences, with these effects being of moderate substantive magnitude. This means that on the overwhelming majority of outcomes relevant to the goals of the PDEV II program, there was no detectable general difference across countries in the trends over time between core and non-core zones, although, as noted, the pooled effects may mask important country-specific effects. An adverse pooled effect was found on interest in community affairs.

Analysis of DiD impacts in “high intensity” zones – i.e., those with greater than average total PDEV II activities – shows one additional significant pooled (cross-country) impact of the program, on perceived access to jobs (see Section III-D). Differences over time on this indicator in the high-intensity core zones were greater than differences in the non-core zones. No additional indicator shows significant pooled effects in low-intensity zones compared to non-core zones.

Country-by-country “high intensity” zone analysis showed a mixed pattern of impacts: greater numbers of indicators in Burkina were significant in the high-intensity zones, especially those pertaining to Social Cohesion and Resilience to Extremism (see Section III-D). Altogether 10 of the 18 indicators showed significant intended impacts in Burkina Faso when comparing high-intensity core zones to non-core zones. Similarly, in Chad and Niger, there were sporadic intended impacts in high-intensity zones (2 in Chad, 2 in Niger) along with adverse effects in Chad concerning the goals of the PDEV II program.

The study included one “list experiment” and one “endorsement experiment” designed to measure in unobtrusive or indirect ways the respondent’s willingness to consider

engaging in specific acts of violent extremism or express approval of groups which engage in violent acts (see Section III-E). The results of these analyses suggest that there is a sizable pool of individuals in all country contexts who would support “an attack on [a] Western country’s embassy that could result in military or civilian casualties” (list experiment), or who would be more likely to oppose a Polio vaccination program if they are told that “an Islamist group, will oppose this program” (endorsement experiment). These figures range from approximately 10-35% of the sampled populations. In general, however, there were no detectable PDEV II core zone impacts on these outcomes, in that respondents in the core zones and non-core zones showed similar concerning trends in these outcomes over time.

Unexpected variation in PDEV II implementation resulted in surveyed areas where no program activities took place, allowing for a DiD pooled analysis of the effects of radio programming. The results of the pooled analyses indicate that zones that were exposed to PDEV II radio programming experienced significantly higher perceptions of inclusiveness in community decision-making, and significantly higher levels of political efficacy, as well as lower levels of support for the justifiability of religious violence and perception that violence is effective to solve problems. These were arguably the indicators that the PDEV II radio programming was designed in particular to influence. These standardized effects were of moderate magnitude, with standard deviation changes of .34 and .45, respectively. To this extent, the radio portion of PDEV II should be viewed as a qualified success. On all other indicators, however, there were insignificant DiD effects of PDEV II radio programming.

The report includes qualitative information from a total of 30 focus groups and 45 in-depth interviews across the three countries. Participants in focus groups in all three countries stressed that PDEV II activities had positive effects but were often more limited in scope than local residents would have wished. The qualitative evidence also suggests that the downturn in oil prices in Chad and the uptick in extremist attacks in Niger have had important overarching effects in those countries. Access to job opportunities remains a source of frustration. In the context of increasing extremist activity, interviewees as well as focus group participants routinely defended Islam as a religion of peace. Trust in local governance remains a challenge, as concerns over transparency persist.

Based on the overall pattern of results found in the report, it is clear that the PDEV II non-radio program did not have consistent impacts across the three country contexts, as there were detectable differences in the trends over time in pooled core versus non-core zones on only two indicators out of the 18 analyzed. Instead, there was significant country-by-country variation in program impact: program effects were strongest in Burkina Faso, where positive impacts were registered in some way (core versus non-core zone, high-intensity core zones versus non-core) on a majority of the 18 indicators, with substantially fewer and weaker effects registered in Chad and Niger. While it is possible that significant effects would be uncovered in theoretically meaningful subgroups of the population (e.g., men versus women, young versus old, rich versus poor), the fact that relatively few impacts were seen in the overall individual country samples – especially in Chad and Niger -- means that detecting these potential impacts will be extremely challenging, requiring, again, substantially more interviews. This means future work will probably need to include more detailed analyses on a country-by-country basis, which will require

additional numbers of interviews within each county to approach requisite levels of statistical power.

While this evaluation was not designed to specifically measure radio programming in core zones, theoretically total program impact in core zones could include both community programming and radio programming effects. This would be predicated on the untested assumption that the effect of radio in the core zones of the program were the same as those found in the “radio” versus “no activity” zone analysis. Under this assumption, combining the pooled program effects across the three countries for both community and radio programming in core zones suggest a total of six indicators with positive impacts, or a third of the indicators surveyed; four related to radio (Community Decision-Making, Political Efficacy, Justifiability of Religious Violence, Violence is Effective) and two related to non-radio (positive effects in Institutional Trust and Perceived Religious Differences), with no overlap of affected indicators attributable to radio and non-radio programming. Significant country-by-country variation exists: in Burkina Faso, indicators impacted by radio programming overlap with non-radio programming effects, suggesting the combined result would be deeper impact in these four overlapping indicators (Community Decision-Making, Political Efficacy, Justifiability of Religious Violence, Violence is Effective). In Niger and Chad, indicators impacted by radio programming do not overlap with non-radio programming effects, suggesting that the combined result could be positive impacts on five indicators in Niger and potentially six indicators in Chad.

Recommendations

These results have several implications for future work both in CVE programming and evaluation activities:

- 1) Given scarce amounts of available resources, consideration should be given to concentrating the programming activities more intensively in fewer zones.
- 2) Donors implementing CVE programming across relatively different country contexts should temper program expectations.
- 3) Factors unique to the Burkina Faso implementation context may have contributed to the relative success of PDEV II and provide suggestive evidence that can be leveraged to inform future programming, including: identification of core zones at baseline, a larger amount of Strategic Objective 1 activities, compressed program implementation timeline, and geographic concentration of core zones.
- 4) Though the results are based on a comparison of fewer zones the radio component should be viewed as a qualified success.

Future evaluations should consider that:

- 1) larger numbers of interviews are needed in order to increase the likelihood of finding statistically significant effects and
- 2) Inclusion of the survey experiments holds considerable promise for future evaluations of CVE programming, identifying support for acts of violence and extremist groups previously hidden by social desirability bias.

Programming Recommendations

Comparing the overall analysis of DiD impacts to the high and low program intensity in Tables 28-9 revealed that the two significant pooled program effects, on institutional trust and on perceived religious differences, were observed *only* in zones with high-intensity programming, but were not found in low-intensity zones. This suggests that non-radio results are driven by high-intensity CVE programming, and that the best way to maximize program effects is by concentrating program activity, creating “high-intensity” interventions that can potentially achieve lasting impact. Given scarce amounts of available resources, donor assistance programs intended to counter violent extremism should consider concentrating programming more intensively in fewer zones in order to maximize the effect of the resources.

Country-level DiD analyses found variation in program effects, as can be viewed in Table 1. The lack of consistency in the effects shown across Chad, Niger, and Burkina suggest that the program cannot be expected to achieve the same results among relatively different country contexts, as implementation logistics and coordination and community contexts (including exposure to violence) varied widely across the three countries. Both Chad and Niger were exposed to greater amounts of terrorist violence during the program period, which may have depressed the effect of activities there. In Burkina Faso, terrorist episodes have increased in recent years, but it is possible that the country context is more receptive to conflict mitigation programming relating to governance and leadership strengthening, given that focus group respondents expressed more interest in politics following the 2015 coup. Variation in country findings extends to our analysis of program intensity in Tables 28-9.

Several factors in the Burkina Faso implementation context may have contributed to the relative success of PDEV II in that country, and these factors may be leveraged to inform future programming, including: a larger amount of Strategic Objective 1 activities, compressed implementation timing, and geographic concentration of core zones. According to the pattern of results observed in Table 24 of the Baseline Report, the core zones in Burkina Faso best conformed to expectations on community indicators of violent extremism risk at baseline. Across the range of indicators examined in the Baseline Report, Burkina Faso zones identified for core programming during IRD efforts to target non-radio activities reflected low Social Cohesion, weaker Resilience to Violent Extremism, and Civic Outlook in community surveys. This allowed for CVE programming to maximize the potential for achieving intended results. The larger amount of Strategic Objective 1 activities conducted relative to other non-radio programming (see Endline Report Figure 4) leading to livelihoods, peace, and conflict resolution awareness-raising activities and leadership interventions in the country may have contributed to the intended changes in public opinion relating to cohesion and resilience to violent extremism. The activity record (see figures 2-4 of the Endline Report) shows that non-radio programming was implemented beginning in Year 2 and concluded early, with project close-out occurring in June of Year 5, suggesting that scheduling program delivery to provide a range of interventions in a relatively short period of time has greatest potential to generate intended program outcomes. The geographic concentration of northern core zones in Burkina Faso (see Endline Report Figure 25) provides suggestive evidence that the program may have benefited from logistical or coordination benefits from the close clustering of target zones.

Niger 2 Burkina Faso 3										
ID3. Province Code (See location codes on page 2.)		<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>							
ID4. Target Zone Code (See location codes on page 2.)		<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>							
ID5. Neighborhood Name (write in)		D7. Day of interview:								
			Single code							
		Monday	1							
		Tuesday	2							
		Wednesday	3							
		Thursday	4							
		Friday	5							
		Saturday	6							
		Sunday	7							
ECode	Name of Enumerator	Signature	ID7b. Date of Interview (dd/mm)							
SCode	Name of Supervisor	Signature	ID8b. Date Completed Check (dd/mm)							
Section F. RESPONDENT IDENTIFICATION										
F1	Respondent Assignment:	MALE – 1 FEMALE – 2								
F2.	Respondent name : Mr/Mrs/Miss :									
F3	Record interview start time using 24 hour clock ____:____ (hour:minute)									
F4	Estimated direction from start point:	<table border="1"> <tr> <td>NF</td> <td>N</td> <td>SF</td> <td>S</td> <td>SO</td> <td>O</td> <td>NO</td> </tr> </table>		NF	N	SF	S	SO	O	NO
NF	N	SF	S	SO	O	NO				

F5	Estimated distance from start point (in M):	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>	<input type="text"/>
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LOCATION CODES CHAD	
Province	
Barh El Gazal 01	Kanem 04
Batha 02	Lac Tchad 05
Borkou 03	N'Djamena 06
Target Zoness	
Am Djamena Bilala 01	Kangalam 800
Am Doback 14	Kouloudia 900
Am Sileb 15	Koundjourou 1000
Assinet 02	Mandjoura 1100
Ati 100	Mao 1200
Baga-Sola 03	Melea 06
Bol 200	Michemire 1300
Chadra 04	Mondo 1400
Commune 10 N'Djamena 500	Moussoro 1500
Commune 1N'Djamena 13	Ngouri 07
Commune 3 N'Djamena 300	Nokou 08
Commune 7 N'Dajamena 16	Ntiona 09
Commune 8 N'Djamena 400	Oum-Hadjer 10
Djedda 600	Wadjigui 11
Doum-Doum 05	Yao 12
Faya Largeau 700	

LOCATION CODES NIGER			
Province			
Agadez	01	Tahoua	05
Diffa	02	Tillabéri	06
Maradi	03	Zinder	07
Niamey	04		
Target Zones			
Adarbissanat	100	Maradi II	1300
Agadez CU	200	Mayahi	05
Arlit	300	N'guigmi	06
Ballayara	01	Niamey 4	07
Bermo	400	Niamey 5	1400
Dan Barto	500	Matameye	08
Bosso	02	Tahoua II	1500
Diffa	600	Tamaské	1600
Doguéraroua	700	Tchintabaraden	1700
G. Roundji	03	Tébaram	09
Gamou	800	Tessaoua	10
Goudoumaria	900	Tillabéri	1800
Iférouane	04	Torodi	1900
Ingall	1000	Zinder I	11
Magaria	1100	Zinder II	2000
Mainé Soroa	1200		
LOCATION CODES BURKINA FASO			

Province	
Kadiogo 01	Soum 04
Oudalan 02	Yatenga 05
Seno 03	Zondoma 06
Target Zones	
Arbinda 900	Nassoumbou 1100
Bani 600	Ouagadougou Arrondissement 4 04
Baraboule 1000	Ouagadougou Arrondissement 9 100
Boussou 01	Ouahigouya 05
Deou 400	Oursi 07
Djibo 800	Séguénéga 08
Dori 500	Seytenga 09
Falagountou 700	Thiou 1200
Gorgadji 02	Tin-Akoff 300
Gorom 200	Tongomayel 10
Gourcy 1300	Tougo 11
Markoye 03	

Instructions for selecting the sample.

Interviewer: Recruit respondents by using the Kish grid. Please give me the names and ages of all men and women aged between 15 and 65 years, beginning by the oldest.

INTERVIEWER: ENTER THE NAMES OF ALL ADULTS (MEN AND WOMEN) AGED 15 TO 65 YEARS. WRITE NAMES FROM THE OLDEST TO THE YOUNGEST AND SELECT THE RESPONDENT ACCORDING TO THE KISH GRID BELOW.

	Name and Surname MEN AND WOMEN	Age From the oldest to the youngest	A	B	C	D	E	F	G	H	J	K	L	M	N	O	P
1			1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1	1
2			2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2	1	2
3			1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3	1	2	3
4			1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3	4	1	2	3
5			4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3	4	5	1	2	3
6			4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6	1	2	3	4	5	6
7			3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	1	2	3
8			3	4	5	6	7	8	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	1
9			2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	1	2	3	4	5	6	7
10			1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	1	2	3	4	5
11			10	11	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	9	10	11	1	2	3
12			9	10	11	12	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11
13			8	9	10	11	12	13	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
14			14	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	11	12	13	14

15			10	11	12	13	14	15	1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9
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Opening Text

Good day. My name is _____. I am from CERFODES, an independent research organization. I do not represent the government of Chad/ Niger/Burkina Faso or any political party. We are studying the views of citizens in Chad/Niger/Burkina Faso, like you, to find out what your life is like and what you think the future will bring. We would like to discuss these issues with you.

Your answers will be confidential. They will be put together with the responses of over 1000 other people we are talking to, to get an overall picture. It will be impossible to pick you out from what you say, so please feel free to tell us what you think. This interview will take about forty minutes.

If you are happy to proceed, then let's begin.

NOTE: DO NOT BEGIN THE INTERVIEW UNLESS THE RESPONDENTS GIVES HIS/HER CONSENT. IF THE RESPONDENT REFUSES, LEAVE THE HOUSE AND RECORD THE REFUSAL.

If consent is granted:

Thank-you. As we go through the questions, please keep in mind that you may say 'I don't know' to any question when you do not know the answer, and you may say 'pass' to any question when you do not feel comfortable answering. You may also terminate the interview at any time. Do you understand?

[Proceed with interview only if answer is positive].

Let's begin.

Section A. Demographics

Q#	Question	Response Code	Skip Logic
A1	Sex of Respondent Do not ask. Observe. Single Code	1....Male 2....Female	

A2	<p>How old are you?</p> <p>WAIT FOR RESPONSE</p> <p>WRITE IN NUMBER.</p> <p>(If age not known, ask respondents to estimate in years, ask them whether they were born before or after an important and widely recognized event, such as a drought. After the interview, or before, if you know you are in an area where respondents are unlikely to know their age, establish with local informants the names of prominent droughts and the approximate years they took place. Estimate the respondent's age.)</p>	<p>_____ years old</p>	<p>Below 15 or more than 65 years old</p> <p>STOP THE INTERVIEW</p>
A3	<p>What is the highest level of school that you have completed?</p>	<p>1...illiterate/none</p> <p>2...no formal schooling</p> <p>3...primary incomplete</p> <p>4...primary complete</p> <p>5...secondary incomplete</p> <p>6...secondary complete</p> <p>7...University/Poly incomplete OND</p> <p>8...University/Poly complete HND</p> <p>9...Post University incomplete</p> <p>10...Post University complete</p>	
A4	<p>Are you currently employed or unemployed?</p>	<p>1...Employed</p> <p>2...Unemployed</p> <p>88...Don't know</p> <p>99...Refused</p>	<p>If code 2 go to →A5; Else go to →A6</p>

<p>A5</p>	<p>If you're not working, what is your status?</p> <p>WAIT FOR RESPONSE</p>	<p>1...Student 2...Non-working pensioner or invalid 3...Housewife/maternity leave 4...Looking for work 5...Not looking for work 6...Waiting for work to start 7...Other non-working, specify 88...Don't know 99...Refused</p>	
<p>A6</p>	<p>I'm going to read a list of items and amenities that you may have inside or around your house. Please tell me whether you have or do not have each item.</p> <p>READ OUT ITEMS.</p> <p>CIRCLE ALL THAT APPLY</p>	<p>a. Fridge/freezer b. Computer or iPad c. Video or DVD player d. Satellite dish e. TV f. Radio g. Telephone (land) h. Telephone (mobile) i. Air conditioning j. Washing machine k. Car l. Gas or electric cooker m. Inside or outside WC n. Inside or outside pipe borne tap</p>	
<p>A7</p>	<p>Speaking now about religion, which religion are you?</p> <p>AWAIT REPLY.</p> <p>Circle ONLY ONE religious group</p>	<p>Muslim.....1 Shia2 Ismaili3 Izala/Wahabit.....4 Sunni Muslim5 Maliki6 Hanafi7</p>	

		Shafi'I 8 Kadria 9 Hanbali 10 Tidjaniya 11 Christian 12 Catholic 13 Protestant 14 Orthodox 15 Other Christian 16 Jewish 17 Buddist..... 18 Hindu 19 Traditional beliefs 20 Baha'i 21 I don't belong to any religion 22 Other.... 23a If other, specify:..... 23b Don't know 88 Refused 99	
A8	How important is religion in your personal life? Is it very important, somewhat important, or not very important? SHOW CARD 01	1...not very important 2...somewhat important 3...very important 88...Don't know 99...Refused	
A9	How often do you attend religious services? READ OUT REPONSES. SINGLE CODE.	1... Several times a day 2... Once a day 3... Several times per week 4...Once a week 5... Once a month 6... Only for religious holidays or special occasions	

		7... Rarely or never 88...Don't know 99...Refused	
A10	How often do you pray? WAIT FOR RESPONSE SINGLE CODE	1... Several times a day 2... Once a day 3... Several times per week 4...Once a week 5... Once a month 6... Only for religious holidays or special occasions 7... Rarely or never 88...Don't know 99...Refused	
A11	And what is your ethnic background? WAIT FOR RESPONSE MULTIPLE CODES		
	CHAD	NIGER	BURKINA FASO

	Arab 1 Kanembou 2 Gourane 3 Peuls 4 Moussei 5 Sara 6 Zaghawa 7 Kanuri 8 Boudouma 9 Moundang 10 Massa 11 Other, Specify 12 Don't know 88 Refused 99	Arab 1 Toubou 2 Hausa 3 Fulbe 4 Zarma/Songhai 5 Gourmantche 6 Tuareg 7 Kanuri 8 Beriberi 9 Boudouma 10 Manga 11 Other, Specify 12 Don't know 88 Refused 99	Mossi 1 Fulani (Peul) 2 Bobo/Dioula 3 Senoufo 4 Goumantche 5 Lobi 6 Gurunsi 7 Dagaaba 8 Tuareg 9 Other, Specify 12 Don't know 88 Refused 99	
A11a	Which of the following groups do you feel you belong first and foremost?	1...Your ethnic group 2...Your religious group 3...Your neighborhood 4... Your country 5... Other 88... DK 99...Refuse		
A12	Which language do you speak most at home?			
	WAIT FOR RESPONSE			
	SINGLE CODE			
	CHAD	NIGER	BURKINA FASO	
	French 1 Arabic 2 Kanembou 3 Fulfulde4	French 1 Arabic 2 Hausa 3 Fulfulde4	French 1 Mooré 2 Fulfuldé3 Dioula/Bambara/ Malinké	

Gourane	5	Gourmanchema5	4
Kanuri	6	Kanuri.	6
Sara	7	Zarma/Songhai	7
Zaghawa	8	Tamashek	8
Boudouma	9	Toubou	9
Moundang	10	Tagdalt.	10
Massa	11	Other, specify	12
Other, specify	12	Don't know	88
Don't know	88	Refused	99
Refused	99		

Section B. Participation, Community Decision Making, Groups, and Trust						
Q#	Question	Response Code				Skip Logic
B1	<p>Now I would like to ask you some questions about how decisions are made in your community. When important decisions are made in this commune/neighborhood/village/camp, how much DO the following people participate: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>USE SHOW CARD 02</p> <p>SINGLE CODE IN EACH ROW</p>					
		Not at all	Somewhat	A lot	DK	Refuse
	a) Ordinary people from the commune/ neighborhood	1	2	3	88	99
	b) Youth	1	2	3	88	99
	c) Women	1	2	3	88	99
	d) People from your own tribe or ethnic group	1	2	3	88	99

	e) People who share your religious views	1	2	3	88	99																																					
<p>B2 And how much do you think the following people SHOULD participate when important decisions are made in this commune/neighborhood/village/camp?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>USE SHOW CARD 02</p> <p>SINGLE CODE IN EACH ROW</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>Not at all</th> <th>Somewhat</th> <th>A lot</th> <th>DK</th> <th>Refuse</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>a) Ordinary people from the commune/ neighborhood</td> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> <td>3</td> <td>88</td> <td>99</td> </tr> <tr> <td>b) Youth</td> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> <td>3</td> <td>88</td> <td>99</td> </tr> <tr> <td>c) Women</td> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> <td>3</td> <td>88</td> <td>99</td> </tr> <tr> <td>d) People from your own tribe or ethnic group</td> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> <td>3</td> <td>88</td> <td>99</td> </tr> <tr> <td>e) People who share your religious views</td> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> <td>3</td> <td>88</td> <td>99</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>									Not at all	Somewhat	A lot	DK	Refuse	a) Ordinary people from the commune/ neighborhood	1	2	3	88	99	b) Youth	1	2	3	88	99	c) Women	1	2	3	88	99	d) People from your own tribe or ethnic group	1	2	3	88	99	e) People who share your religious views	1	2	3	88	99
	Not at all	Somewhat	A lot	DK	Refuse																																						
a) Ordinary people from the commune/ neighborhood	1	2	3	88	99																																						
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d) People from your own tribe or ethnic group	1	2	3	88	99																																						
e) People who share your religious views	1	2	3	88	99																																						
B3	<p>Are you satisfied, neutral, or dissatisfied with the way decisions are made in your community?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES.</p> <p>USE SHOWCARD 02a</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...Dissatisfied</p> <p>2...Neutral</p> <p>3...Satisfied</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Refused</p>																																									
B4	<p>Now I'd like your opinion on some governance issues. I'm going to read a list of statements, and I'd like you to please tell me whether you agree with the following statements: not at all, somewhat, or quite.</p>																																										

	SHOW CARD 02a					
		Not at all	Somewhat	Quite	DK	Refuse
	a) My opinions are respected by local leaders	1	2	3	88	99
	b) Local government takes into account the opinions of citizens in decision-making processes	1	2	3	88	99
B5	I'm going to list a number of activities. Please tell me whether you have or have not done each activity in the past 12 months.					
	Single Code in Each Row					
		Yes	No	DK	Refuse	
	a) Attended a commune/neighborhood councilor other public meeting	1	2	88	99	
	b) Met with an elected official, called him/her, or sent a letter	1	2	88	99	
	c) Notified the village chief about a local problem	1	2	88	99	
	d) Voted	1	2	88	99	
	e) Participated in community development activities	1	2	88	99	
	f) Joined a protest or demonstration	1	2	88	99	
B6	Speaking about your role in the community, I am going to read out a list of groups that people join or attend. For each one, could you tell me whether you are a member or not a member?					
	SHOW CARD 03					
		Not a member	Active member	Inactive member	DK	Refuse
	a) A religious group (e.g. a mosque, church)	1	2	3	88	99

	b) A trade union or farmers association	1	2	3	88	99	
	c) A professional or business association	1	2	3	88	99	
	d) A community or self-help association	1	2	3	88	99	
	e) A youth group	1	2	3	88	99	
	f) Some other voluntary association or community group. SPECIFY _____	1	2	3	88	99	
B7	ASK B7 IF CODE 2 HAS BEEN CHOSEN FOR AT LEAST ONE OF THE QUESTIONS IN B6; IF NOT GO TO B8.						
	Thinking about the members of the group(s) to which you belong, do any of the groups...						
			Yes	No	DK	Refuse	
	a) include both men and women?	1	2	88	99		
	b) include people of different religious views?	1	2	88	99		
	c) include people of different ethnic groups?	1	2	88	99		
B8	I will now read you two statements about your neighborhood. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with these statements.						
	SHOW CARD 04						
		Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	DK	Refuse	
	a) Most people are willing to help you if you ask	1	2	3	88	99	
	b) It is naïve to trust people	1	2	3	88	99	

B9	Now I would like to ask you about the trust you have in different groups of people. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements.					
	READ OUT RESPONSES.					
	USE SHOWCARD 04.					
		Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree	DK	Refuse
	a) I trust local authorities	1	2	3	88	99
	b) I trust central government	1	2	3	88	99
	c) I trust religious leaders	1	2	3	88	99
d) I trust non-governmental organizations	1	2	3	88	99	
e) I trust the police	1	2	3	88	99	
f) I trust the military	1	2	3	88	99	
B10	On how many days out of the last 7 did you...					
		Number of days	DK	Refuse		
	a) talk to someone who lives in a different community		88	99		
	b) talk to someone with different religious view		88	99		
c) talk to someone from a different ethnic group from yours		88	99			
B10B	How strongly do you feel you belong to your immediate community/neighborhood?	1...Very strongly 2...Fairly strongly 3...Not very strongly 4...Not at all strongly 88...DK 99...Refused				

B11	<p>In elections, Chadians/Nigerians/Burkinabe often vote for candidates from their own ethnic group. Which of the following statements is closer to your view?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 05</p> <p>Circle ONLY ONE CODE</p>		
	<p>1. It is normal to want to elect someone from your ethnic community</p> <p>2. Voters should place much less emphasis on ethnic considerations.</p>	<p>1...Selects statement 1</p> <p>2...Selects statement 2</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Refused</p>	
B12	<p>Do you agree or disagree with the following statement:</p> <p>I tell my children (or I will tell my future children) that they should only marry people from their same ethnic group</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 04</p>	<p>1...Disagree</p> <p>2...Neither agree nor disagree</p> <p>3...Agree</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Refused</p>	

Section C. Life Satisfaction, Political Interest, Media Use, Economic and Services Evaluation			
Q#	Question	Response Code	Skip Logic
C1	<p>Here is a ladder representing the “ladder of life.” Let’s suppose the top of the ladder (10) is the best possible life for you; and the bottom (0), the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder do you personally stand at the present time?</p> <p>USE SHOWCARD 06.</p> <p>SINGLE CODE.</p> <p>Worst Life Best Life</p> <p>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</p> <p>Don’t know...88</p> <p>Refused... 99</p>		

C3	<p>And on which step do you think you will stand in the future, say two years from now?</p> <p>USE SHOWCARD 06.</p> <p>SINGLE CODE.</p> <p>Worst Life Best Life</p> <p>0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10</p> <p>Don't know...88</p> <p>Refused... 99</p>		
C4	<p>Thinking first of your community, would you say you have a great deal of interest, some interest, or very little interest in local community affairs?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 07</p> <p>Circle ONLY ONE CODE</p>	<p>1...very little interest</p> <p>2...some interest</p> <p>3...a great deal of interest</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...refused</p>	
C6	<p>In general, would you say that the economy of [COUNTRY] is better, worse, or about the same than it was a year ago?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 08</p> <p>Circle ONLY ONE CODE</p>	<p>1...worse</p> <p>2...the same</p> <p>3...better</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...refuse</p>	
C6A	<p>In general, would you say that your household financial situation is better, worse, or about the same than it was a year ago?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 08</p> <p>Circle ONLY ONE CODE</p>	<p>1...worse</p> <p>2...the same</p> <p>3...better</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...refuse</p>	
C7	<p>In general, would you say that the country is headed in the right direction or the wrong</p>	<p>1...right direction</p> <p>2...wrong direction</p>	

	direction? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 09 Circle ONLY ONE CODE	88...DK 99...refused	
--	--	-------------------------	--

C8	Now I would like to ask you about services that are available in your community. Are you satisfied or dissatisfied with your access to... READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 10 Circle ONLY ONE CODE IN EACH ROW				
		Satisfied	Dissatisfied	DK	Refuse
	a) Education/Schools	1	2	88	99
	b) Health services/clinics/hospitals	1	2	88	99
	c) Access to water, electricity, and other services	1	2	88	99
	d) Government legal services (courts)	1	2	88	99

C10	Now I would like to ask you some questions specifically about middle school and vocational school Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements... READ OUT RESPONSES. USE SHOWCARD 04. SINGLE CODE IN EACH ROW.						
		Disagree	Neither	Agree	DK	Ref.	
	a) Education is only for boys, but not for girls	1	2	3	88	99	
	b) Vocational training is accessible for people like me	1	2	3	88	99	

C11	<p>How difficult is it to get a job in [COUNTRY] today: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02</p> <p>Circle ONLY ONE CODE</p>	<p>1...Not at all</p> <p>2...Somewhat</p> <p>3...A lot</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Refused</p>				
C13	<p>Now I would like to ask you a few questions about how politics works in [YOUR COUNTRY]. Do you know how long the term of office is for the President of [Country]? That is, after he is elected, how many years does he stay in office before the next election?</p> <p>[All countries = 5 years]</p>	<p>1...correct answer given</p> <p>2...incorrect answer given</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>				
C14	<p>Do you happen to know how many seats there are in the National Assembly?</p> <p>[Burkina Faso = 127]</p> <p>[Chad = 188]</p> <p>[Niger = 113]</p>	<p>Number given by respondent</p> <p>[]</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>				
C15	How well would you say the government is managing the following matters?					
		Very badly	Fairly	Very well	DK	Ref
	a) Improving living standards	1	2	3	88	99
	b) Keeping the community safe	1	2	3	88	99
	c) Improving public services	1	2	3	88	99
	d) Dealing with violent groups in the region	1	2	3	88	99
C16	<p>Now, I would like to ask you about rights of citizens.</p> <p>In your view, how well does the government protect the following rights:</p>					

		Not at all	Somewhat	Very well	DK	Ref	
	a) Freedom of expression and opinion	1	2	3	88	99	
	b) Protection from arbitrary arrest and ensuring fair trials	1	2	3	88	99	
	c) Protection from torture and cruel, inhuman or degrading punishment	1	2	3	88	99	
	d) Equal treatment before the law	1	2	3	88	99	
C17	Please tell me how much you agree that women should be equal to men regarding the following matters.						
		Disagree strongly	Somewhat Disagree	Somewhat Agree	Agree strongly	DK	Ref
	a) In family and household matters	1	2	3	4	88	99
	b) With regards to owning property and receiving inheritance	1	2	3	4	88	99
	c) With regards to employment	1	2	3	4	88	99
	d) Being a candidate in local, parliamentary, and presidential elections	1	2	3	4	88	99
	e) Being a clan chief	1	2	3	4	88	99
C18	In your opinion, how often do Nigerien/Chadian/Burkinabe government officials who commit crimes [break the law] get punished?	1...Always 2...Rarely 3...Never 88...DK 99...Refuse					
C19	In your opinion, over the past year, has the level of corruption in Niger/Chad/Burkina	1...Increased					

	Faso increased, decreased or stayed the same?	2...Stayed the same 3...Decreased 88...DK 99...Refuse	
--	---	--	--

Section D. Violence and Extremism			
Q#	Question	Response Code	Skip Logic
D1A	Now I would like to ask you about your community. Differences often exist between people living in the same village/neighborhood. To what extent do you feel that ethnic differences tend to divide people in your village/neighborhood? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02B	1...Not at all 2...Somewhat 3...A lot 88...DK 99...Refuse	
D1B	Do ethnic divisions in your village/neighborhood ever lead to violence?	1...yes 2...no 88...DK 99...Refuse	
D2A	To what extent do you feel that religious differences tend to divide people in your village/neighborhood? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02B	1...Not at all 2...Somewhat 3...A lot 88...DK 99...Refuse	
D2B	Do religious divisions in your village/neighborhood ever lead to violence?	1...yes 2...no 88...DK 99...Refuse	
D2C	How often have you or members of your family ever been unfairly treated because of your ethnic	1...Often	

	background?	2...Sometimes 3...Never 88...DK 99...Refused	
D2D	How often have you or members of your family ever been unfairly treated because of your religious views?	1...Often 2...Sometimes 3...Never 88...DK 99...Refused	
D2E	In the past 12 months, have you or has someone else in your household been physically attacked?	1...Yes, me. 2...Yes, someone in my household. 3...Yes, both me and someone in my household. 4...No 88...DK 99...Refused	
D3	When do you think that violence is an effective method to solve problems: often, sometimes, or never? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 11	1...Often 2...Sometimes 3...Never 88...DK 99...Refused	
D4	Some people think that using arms and violence against civilians in defense of their religion is justified. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that using arms and violence against civilians in defense of your religion can be often justified, sometimes justified, or never justified? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 11	1...Often 2...Sometimes 3...Never 88...DK 99...Refused	

D6	Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statements READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 04 Circle ONLY ONE CODE					
		Disagree	Neither	Agree	DK	Ref
	a) Violence in the name of Islam can be justified	1	2	3	88	99
	b) The United States is at war against Islam, not terrorism	1	2	3	88	99
	c) Youth (ages 15 to 30) are involved in the use of violence in the name of religion in this country	1	2	3	88	99
	d) The government should work with western countries to fight terrorism	1	2	3	88	99
	e) Al Qaeda's violent actions are permitted under Islamic law	1	2	3	88	99
D7	Which of these three statements comes closest to your own opinion? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 12 Circle ONLY ONE CODE					
	a) Democracy is preferable to any other form of government b) In certain situations, a nondemocratic form of government can be preferable c) It doesn't matter to me what form of government we have	1...Selects A 2...Selects B 3...Selects C 88...DK 99...REF				
D8	Some people say we would be better off if the country was governed differently. What do you think about the following options? Do you agree or disagree that... READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 04 Circle ONLY ONE CODE IN EACH ROW					
		Disagree	Neither	Agree	DK	Ref

				e				
	a) we should get rid of elections so that a strong leader can decide everything	1	2	3	88	99		
	b) We should be governed by Sharia Law	1	2	3	88	99		
	c) we should let the military rule the country	1	2	3	88	99		
	d) we should only have one political party	1	2	3	88	99		
D9A	Now, I would like to ask you again about your community. In the last 12 months, has there been violence in your community associated with:					If code 1 for any go to → D9B Else go to → D10		
		Yes	No	DK	Ref			
	a1) A strike or protest	1	2	88	99			
	b1) Conflict over land	1	2	88	99			
	c1) Armed robbery or burglary	1	2	88	99			
	d1) Ethnic or religious violence	1	2	88	99			
	e1) A youth-elder conflict	1	2	88	99			
	f1) Another type of conflict	1	2	88	99			
D9B	Generally, do you think that the violence associated with any of these events was justified?	1...Yes 2...No 88...DK 99...Refused						
D9C	Have you ever been arrested or spent a night in jail?	1...Yes 2...No 88...DK 99...Refuse						

Respondents will be split for question D10. Half of the respondents will respond to D10: Control Group, and the other half will respond to D10: Treatment Group.		
D10: Control	CONTROL GROUP ONLY If respondent answers to D10 Control, skip directly to D11.	
<p>Imagine that you hear on the radio that a Western newspaper has published offensive images of the Prophet Mohammed committing a crime. You could respond to this affront in many ways. I'm going to read you a list of possible responses now. Please listen to them and then tell me how many of the following reactions you would support.</p> <p>Please, do not tell me <i>which</i> options are necessary, only <i>how many</i>.</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 14</p> <p>WRITE THE NUMBER OF OPTIONS</p>	<p>a. A peaceful protest taking place at the Western country's embassy</p> <p>b. Your government demanding a formal apology from the Western country</p> <p>c. Your government declaring war against the Western country</p> <p>DK 88</p> <p>Refuse 99</p>	<input type="text"/>
D10: Treatment	TREATMENT GROUP ONLY Only ask item below if respondent did not receive control group item	
<p>Imagine that you hear on the radio that a Western newspaper has published offensive images of the Prophet Mohammed committing a crime. You could respond to this affront in many ways. I'm going to read you a list of possible responses now. Please listen to them and then tell me how many of the following reactions you would support.</p> <p>Please, do not tell me <i>which</i> options are necessary, only <i>how many</i>.</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 15</p> <p>WRITE THE NUMBER OF OPTIONS</p>	<p>a. A peaceful protest taking place at the Western country's embassy</p> <p>b. Your government demanding a formal apology from the Western country</p> <p>c. Your government declaring war against the Western country</p> <p>d. An attack on the country's embassy that could result in military or civilian casualties</p> <p>DK 88</p> <p>Refuse 99</p>	<input type="text"/>
Respondents will be split for question D11. Half of the respondents will respond to D11: Control Group, and the other half will respond to D11: Treatment Group.		
D11: Control	CONTROL GROUP ONLY If respondent answers D11 Control, skip directly to D12.	

	<p>The World Health Organization recently announced a plan to introduce universal Polio vaccination across {Country}. How much do you approve of such a plan?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02a</p> <p>CIRCLE ONE CODE</p>	<p>1...not at all</p> <p>2...somewhat</p> <p>3...quite</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Refuse</p>		
D11: Treatment	<p>TREATMENT GROUP ONLY</p> <p>Only ask item below if respondent did not receive control group item</p>			
	<p>The World Health Organization recently announced a plan to introduce universal Polio vaccination across {Country}. It is likely that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)/Boko Haram, an Islamist group, will oppose this program. How much do you approve of such a plan?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02a</p> <p>CIRCLE ONE CODE</p>	<p>1...not at all</p> <p>2...somewhat</p> <p>3...quite</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Refuse</p>		
D12.	<p>I will now read you a series of statements. Please tell me if you believe that your neighbors, friends and family agree with the following statements:</p>	Your neighbors	Your friends	Your family
	<p>Violence is often an effective method to solve problems.</p>	<p>1...Yes</p> <p>2...No</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	<p>1...Yes</p> <p>2...No</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	<p>1...Yes</p> <p>2...No</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>
	<p>Using arms and violence against civilians in defense of one's religion can be often justified.</p>	<p>1...Yes</p> <p>2...No</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	<p>1...Yes</p> <p>2...No</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	<p>1...Yes</p> <p>2...No</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>
	<p>Violence in the name of Islam can be often justified.</p>	<p>1...Yes</p> <p>2...No</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	<p>1...Yes</p> <p>2...No</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	<p>1...Yes</p> <p>2...No</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>

Section E. Peace and Tolerance Radio Module

Q#	Question	Response Code						Skip Logic
E1	How often within the last month have you...							
	READ OUT RESPONSES							
	SHOW CARD 17							
	CIRCLE ONE CODE IN EACH ROW							
		Rarely	Once a month	Sever al times a week	Every day	DK	Ref	
a) made or received voice calls on a mobile phone	1	2	3	4	88	99		
b) sent or received an SMS (text message) on a mobile phone	1	2	3	4	88	99		
c) listened to the radio	1	2	3	4	88	99		

CHAD			
Q#	Question	Response Code	Skip Logic
E4a	Over the past year or so, did you ever listen to the radio program <u>Dabalaye</u> (the meeting place)? IF RESPONDENTS SAY THEY DON'T KNOW THE PROGRAM, READ OUT: It's a governance program with presenters Mahamouth and Allamine	1...Yes 2...No 88...DK 99...Ref	If code 2, 88 or 99 go to E11a
E5a	IF YES AT E4a: How often would you say you listened to the program? USE SHOWCARD 18. SINGLE CODE.	1... Several times a week 2... Once a week 3... Once a month 4... Less than once a month 88...DK 99...Ref	
E6a	How much did you like [Dabalaye]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?	1...not at all 2...Somewhat 3...A lot	

	<p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E7a	<p>How much did you trust the information you heard on [Dabalaye]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...not at all</p> <p>2...Somewhat</p> <p>3...A lot</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E8a	<p>How many people did you speak to about things you had heard on the radio show [Dabalaye]? No one, one or two people, three or four people, or more than four people?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 19</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...no one</p> <p>2...one or two people</p> <p>3...three or four people</p> <p>4...more than four people</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E10a	<p>Generally, when you listened to [Dabalaye], can you tell me who you were with when you listened? Alone, with some friends, with family, in a formal listening club?</p>	<p>1... alone</p> <p>2... with some friends</p> <p>3... with family</p> <p>4... in a formal listening club</p> <p>88... DK</p> <p>99... Ref</p>	Go to E4b
E11a	<p>How many people spoke to you about things they had heard on the radio show [Dabalaye]? Yes (how many times) or No?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p>	<p>1...no one</p> <p>2...one or two people</p> <p>3...three or four people</p> <p>4...more than four people</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	Go to E4b

Now I would like to talk about the radio program Chabab Al Haye

E4b	<p>Over the past year or so, did you ever listen to the radio program <u>Chabab Al Haye</u> (Youth Alive)?</p> <p>IF RESPONDENTS SAY THEY DON'T KNOW THE PROGRAM, READ OUT: It's a youth program with presenters Djamilia and Abdelfatha</p>	<p>1...Yes 2...No 88...DK 99...Ref</p>	<p>If code 2, 88 or 99 go to E11b</p>
E5b	<p>IF YES AT E4b: How often would you say you listened to the program? USE SHOWCARD 18. SINGLE CODE.</p>	<p>1... Several times a week 2... Once a week 3... Once a month 4... Less than once a month</p> <p>88...DK 99...Ref</p>	
E6b	<p>How much did you like [<u>Chabab Al Haye</u>]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...not at all 2...Somewhat 3...A lot 88...DK 99...Ref</p>	
E7b	<p>How much did you trust the information you heard on [<u>Chabab Al Haye</u>]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...not at all 2...Somewhat 3...A lot 88...DK 99...Ref</p>	
E8b	<p>How many people did you speak to about things you had heard on the radio show [<u>Chabab Al Haye</u>] in the last year or so? No one, one or two people, three or four people, or more than four people ?</p>	<p>1...no one 2...one or two people 3...three or four people 4...more than four people 88...DK</p>	

	READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 19 SINGLE CODE	99...Ref	
E10b	Generally, when you listened to [<u>Chabab Al Haye</u>], can you tell me who you were with when you listened? Alone, with some friends, with family, in a formal listening club?	1... alone 2... with some friends 3... with family 4... in a formal listening club 88... DK 99... Ref	Go to Section F
E11b	Did anybody speak to you about things they had heard on the radio show [<u>Chabab Al Haye</u>]? Yes (how many times) or No? READ OUT RESPONSES	1... Yes, several times 2... Yes, a few times 3... No 88...DK 99...Ref	Go to Section F

NIGER			
Q#	Question	Response Code	Skip Logic
E4a	Over the past year or so, did you ever listen to the radio program <u>Sada Zumunci</u> (Solidarity)? IF RESPONDENTS SAY THEY DON'T KNOW THE PROGRAM, READ OUT: It's a governance and religious affairs program with presenters Mairo and Abdou	1...Yes 2...No 88...DK 99...Ref	If code 2, 88 or 99 go to E11a
E5a	IF YES AT E4a: How often would you say you listened to the program? USE SHOWCARD 18.	1... Several times a week 2... Once a week 3... Once a month 4... Every three months	

	SINGLE CODE.	88...DK 99...Ref	
E6a	How much did you like [<u>Sada Zumunci</u>]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE	1...not at all 2...Somewhat 3...A lot 88...DK 99...Ref	
E7a	How much did you trust the information you heard on [<u>Sada Zumunci</u>]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE	1...not at all 2...Somewhat 3...A lot 88...DK 99...Ref	
E8a	How many people did you speak to about things you had heard on the radio show [<u>Sada Zumunci</u>] in the last year? no one, one or two people, three or four people, or more than four people ? READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 19 SINGLE CODE	1...no one 2...one or two people 3...three or four people 4...more than four people 88...DK 99...Ref	
E10a	Generally, when you listened to [<u>Sada Zumunci</u>], can you tell me who you were with when you listened? Alone, with some friends, with family, in a formal listening club?	1... alone 2... with some friends 3... with family 4... in a formal listening club 88... DK 99... Ref	Go to E4b

E11a	<p>Did anybody speak to you about things they had heard on the radio show [Sada Zumunci]? Yes (how many times) or No?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p>	<p>1... Yes, several times 2... Yes, a few times 3... No 88...DK 99...Ref</p>	Go to E4b
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Now I would like to talk about the radio program Gwadaben Matassa (Youth Boulevard)

E4b	<p>Over the past year or so, did you ever listen to the radio program <u>Gwadaben Matassa</u> (Youth Boulevard)?</p> <p>IF RESPONDENTS SAY THEY DON'T KNOW THE PROGRAM, READ OUT: It's a youth program with presenters Djamilia and Abdelfatha</p>	<p>1...Yes 2...No 88...DK 99...Ref</p>	If code 2, 88 or 99 go to E11b
E5b	<p>IF YES AT E4b: How often would you say you listened to the program?</p> <p>USE SHOWCARD 18. SINGLE CODE.</p>	<p>1... Several times a week 2... Once a week 3... Once a month 4... Less than once a month</p> <p>88...DK 99...Ref</p>	
E6b	<p>How much did you like [<u>Gwadaben Matassa</u>]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...not at all 2...Somewhat 3...A lot 88...DK 99...Ref</p>	
E7b	<p>How much did you trust the information you heard on [<u>Gwadaben Matassa</u>]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p>	<p>1...not at all 2...Somewhat 3...A lot</p>	

	<p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 02</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E8b	<p>How many people did you speak to about things you had heard on the radio show [Gwadaben Matassa] in the last year or so? no one, one or two people, three or four people, or more than four people ?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p> <p>SHOW CARD 19</p> <p>SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...no one</p> <p>2...one or two people</p> <p>3...three or four people</p> <p>4...more than four people</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	
E10b	<p>Generally, when you listened to [Gwadaben Matassa], can you tell me who you were with when you listened? Alone, with some friends, with family, in a formal listening club?</p>	<p>1... alone</p> <p>2... with some friends</p> <p>3... with family</p> <p>4... in a formal listening club</p> <p>88... DK</p> <p>99... Ref</p>	Go to Section F
E11a	<p>Did anybody speak to you about things they had heard on the radio show [Gwadaben Matassa]? Yes (how many times) or No?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p>	<p>1... Yes, several times</p> <p>2... Yes, a few times</p> <p>3... No</p> <p>88...DK</p> <p>99...Ref</p>	Go to Section F

BURKINA FASO			
Q#	Question	Response Code	Skip Logic
E4a	Over the past year or so, did you ever listen to the radio program <i>Malegr</i>	1...Yes	If

	<p>Sooré (Voices of Change) ?</p> <p>IF RESPONDENTS SAY THEY DON'T KNOW THE PROGRAM, READ OUT: It's a youth program in Mooré with presenters Angèle and Eric.</p>	<p>2...No 88...DK 99...Ref</p>	<p>code 2, 88 or 99 go to E11a</p>
E5a	<p>IF YES AT E4a: How often would you say you listened to the program? USE SHOWCARD 18. SINGLE CODE.</p>	<p>1... Several times a week 2... Once a week 3... Once a month 4... Less than once a month</p> <p>88...DK 99...Ref</p>	
E6a	<p>How much did you like [<i>Malegr Sooré</i>]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...not at all 2...Somewhat 3...A lot 88...DK 99...Ref</p>	
E7a	<p>How much did you trust the information you heard on [<i>Malegr Sooré</i>]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...not at all 2...Somewhat 3...A lot 88...DK 99...Ref</p>	
E8a	<p>How many people did you speak to about things you had heard on the radio show [<i>Malegr Sooré</i>] in the last year or so? no one, one or two people, three or four people, or more than four people ?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES</p>	<p>1...no one 2...one or two people 3...three or four people 4...more than four people 88...DK 99...Ref</p>	

	SHOW CARD 19 SINGLE CODE		
E10a	Generally, when you listened to [<i>Malegr Sooré</i>], can you tell me who you were with when you listened? Alone, with some friends, with family, in a formal listening club?	1... alone 2... with some friends 3... with family 4... in a formal listening club 88... DK 99... Ref	Go to E4b
E11a	Did anybody speak to you about things they had heard on the radio show [<i>Malegr Sooré</i>]? Yes (how many times) or No? READ OUT RESPONSES	1... Yes, several times 2... Yes, a few times 3... No 88...DK 99...Ref	Go to E4b

Now I would like to talk about the radio program Pinal Sukabè (Youth Awakening)

E4b	Over the past year or so, did you ever listen to the radio program Pinal Sukabè (Youth Awakening)? IF RESPONDENTS SAY THEY DON'T KNOW THE PROGRAM, READ OUT: It's a youth program in Mooré with presenters Issouf and Kady.	1...Yes 2...No 88...DK 99...Ref	If code 2, 88 or 99 go to E11b
E5b	IF YES AT E4b: How often would you say you listened to the program? USE SHOWCARD 18. SINGLE CODE.	1... Several times a week 2... Once a week 3... Once a month 4... Less than once a month 88...DK 99...Ref	

E6b	<p>How much did you like [Pinal Sukabè]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...not at all 2...Somewhat 3...A lot 88...DK 99...Ref</p>	
E7b	<p>How much did you trust the information you hear on [Pinal Sukabè]: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 02 SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...not at all 2...Somewhat 3...A lot 88...DK 99...Ref</p>	
E8b	<p>How many people did you speak to about things you had heard on the radio show [Pinal Sukabè] in the last year or so? no one, one or two people, three or four people, or more than four people ?</p> <p>READ OUT RESPONSES SHOW CARD 19 SINGLE CODE</p>	<p>1...no one 2...one or two people 3...three or four people 4...more than four people 88...DK 99...Ref</p>	
E10b	<p>Generally, when you listened to [Pinal Sukabè], can you tell me who you were with when you listened? Alone, with some friends, with family, in a formal listening club?</p>	<p>1... alone 2... with some friends 3... with family 4... in a formal listening club 88... DK 99... Ref</p>	Go to Section F
E11b	<p>[Ask only if E4b is 2, 88, or 99]</p> <p>Did anybody speak to you about things they had heard on the radio show [Pinal</p>	<p>1... Yes, several times 2... Yes, a few times 3... No</p>	Go to Section F

	Sukabè]? Yes (how many times) or No? READ OUT RESPONSES	88...DK 99...Ref	
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Section F. Experience with PDEV II Programming

F3	Please tell me how many times over the past year you have attended any of the following kinds of events or activities:						
	Read out Responses						
	Use Show Card 20						
	Single Code in Each Row						
		Never	One or two times	Three or four times	More than four times	DK	Refuse
	a) An organized workshop or forum in your community where issues about peace or democracy were discussed	1	2	3	4	88	99
	b) A poetry reading or a drama about peace or democracy issues	1	2	3	4	88	99
	c) Training to develop ways to solve community problems	1	2	3	4	88	99
d) An organized workshop or forum at a place other than a mosque where imams or religious leaders discussed peace or democracy with people in the community	1	2	3	4	88	99	
e) Trainings to help you find work or find a better job	1	2	3	4	88	99	
f) Trainings to help you learn how to run a business or write an application for a business development grant	1	2	3	4	88	99	

	g) A workshop on citizenship, human rights, tolerance, or diversity.	1	2	3	4	88	99
	h) Training on participatory theater or mobile cinema	1	2	3	4	88	99
	i) Youth leadership training	1	2	3	4	88	99
F4	Please tell me if you have ever seen the following logos:						
		Yes	No	DK	Refuse		
		1	2	88	99		
		1	2	88	99		
		1	2	88	99		
		1	2	88	99		

Section O: Panel Follow-up Instructions and Respondent Location		
	<p>Thank you for taking the time to answer our survey.</p> <p>We may return in a couple of years to ask you some more questions. I hope that I will be the person who will return, but it may be another person in my place. Because I may not be the same person, may I ask you a few more questions just to make sure we find you again?</p>	
G2	Would you be willing to speak with us again in the next few years to we can see how	Yes.....1

	you're doing?	No.....2	
G4	Could you give us the contact information for someone who you expect will be able to help us find you in the next few years?	[WRITE NAME AND PHONE NUMBER OF CONTACT]	
O1	Can we find you the same time of day during the week?	Yes.....1	No.....2
O2	Which is the best time to reach you?		
O3	Can we find you again in the next couple of years here?	Yes.....1	No.....2
O4	If No, where can we find you and what is the best way to get there? Interviewer: note the precise location and instructions for finding the house for the next wave:		
O5	Respondent's Nick name as known in his/her neighborhood		
O6	Respondent's occupation/profession		
O7	Sector/ Quarter		
O8	Respondent/household complete address :		
O9	Respondent mobile number :		
O10	Respondent position in the household		
O11	Name of head of household if different from		

	respondent		
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Section G: Interviewer Data Entry			
G5	Record interview end time using 24 hour clock	_____ : _____ (hour:minute)	
<i>FOR INTERVIEWER COMPLETION ONLY --DO NOT ASK RESPONDENT! PLEASE COMPLETE THIS SECTION AS SOON AS POSSIBLE AFTER YOU HAVE LEFT THE RESPONDENT'S HOME.</i>			
G6	Length of interview	_____ Minutes	
G7	Sex of interviewer	Male..... 1 Female..... 2	
G8	In what language was the interview conducted?	French 1 Arabic 2 French and Arabic 3 Kanembu 4 Hausa 5 Zarma 6 Tamashek 7 Gourane 8 Other, specify _____ 9	
G9 [Afr Bar]	Were there any other people immediately present who were listening during the interview?	No one..... .1 Spouse only.....	

			.2 Children only.....3 A few others.....4 Small crowd.....5	
G10 [Afr Bar]	What was the respondent's attitude toward you during the interview?			
	A. Was he or she	Friendly 1	In between 2	Hostile 3
	B. What he or she	Interested 1	In between 2	Bored 3
	C. Was he or she	Cooperative 1	In between 2	Uncooperative 3
	D. Was he or she	Patient 1	In between 2	Impatient 3
	E. Was he or she	At ease 1	In between 2	Suspicious 3
	F. Was he or she	Honest 1	In between 2	Misleading 3
G11 [Afr Bar]	What proportion of the questions do you feel the respondent had difficulty answering?		All 1	
			Most2 Some3 Few4 None	

	5	
G12	On which attempt was the interview completed?	First attempt.....1 Second attempt.....2 Third attempt.....3	
G13	Please note any questions that caused particular difficulties for the respondent: [CONTRACTOR: Do not code this list for the data set. Only provide summary of problem questions in the Technical Report]. <hr/> <hr/> <hr/>		

Appendix B. Measurement Guide for PDEV Indicators

Question numbers in **BLUE** correspond directly to items in the original PDEV II baseline study.

Social Cohesion				
Interpersonal Trust	B8. I will now read you two statements about your neighborhood. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with these statements:			
		Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree
	a) Most people are willing to help you if you ask	1	2	3
Institutional Trust	B9 Now I would like to ask you about the trust you have in different groups of people. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statements.			
		Disagree	Neither agree nor disagree	Agree
	a) I trust local authorities	1	2	3
	b) I trust central government	1	2	3
	c) I trust religious leaders	1	2	3
	d) I trust non-governmental organizations	1	2	3
	e) I trust the police	1	2	3
	Measured through additive index of the institutional trust items.			
Community Decision-Making	B1. Now I would like to ask you some questions about how decisions are made in your community. When important decisions are made in this commune/neighborhood/village/camp, how much DO the following people participate: not at all, somewhat, or a lot?			
		Not at all	Somewhat	A lot
	a) Ordinary people from the commune/ neighborhood	1	2	3
Political Participation	B5. I'm going to list a number of activities. Please tell me whether you have or have not done each activity in the past 12 months.			
		Yes	No	
	a) Attended a commune/neighborhood councilor other public meeting	1	2	
	b) Met with an elected official, called him/her, or sent a letter	1	2	
	c) Notified the village chief about a local problem	1	2	
Interethnic Marriage	B12. Do you agree or disagree with the following statement: I tell my children (or I will tell my future children) that they should only marry people from their same ethnic group. 1...Disagree 2...Neither agree nor disagree 3...Agree			
Resilience to Extremism				
Access to Jobs	C11. How difficult is it to get a job in [Chad/Niger/Burkina] today: not at all, somewhat, or a lot? 1...Not at all			

	2...Somewhat 3...A lot												
Access to Vocational Schools	<p>C10. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statement...</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>Disagree</th> <th>Neither</th> <th>Agree</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>b) Vocational training is accessible for people like me</td> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> <td>3</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		Disagree	Neither	Agree	b) Vocational training is accessible for people like me	1	2	3				
	Disagree	Neither	Agree										
b) Vocational training is accessible for people like me	1	2	3										
Political Efficacy	<p>B4. Now I'd like your opinion on some governance issues. I'm going to read a list of statements, and I'd like you to please tell me whether you agree with the following statements: not at all, somewhat, or quite.</p> <table border="1"> <thead> <tr> <th></th> <th>Not at all</th> <th>Somewhat</th> <th>Quite</th> </tr> </thead> <tbody> <tr> <td>a) My opinions are respected by local leaders</td> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> <td>3</td> </tr> <tr> <td>b) Local government takes into account the opinions of citizens in decision-making processes</td> <td>1</td> <td>2</td> <td>3</td> </tr> </tbody> </table>		Not at all	Somewhat	Quite	a) My opinions are respected by local leaders	1	2	3	b) Local government takes into account the opinions of citizens in decision-making processes	1	2	3
	Not at all	Somewhat	Quite										
a) My opinions are respected by local leaders	1	2	3										
b) Local government takes into account the opinions of citizens in decision-making processes	1	2	3										
Perceived Ethnic Differences	<p>D1A. Now I would like to ask you about your community. Differences often exist between people living in the same village/neighborhood. To what extent do you feel that ethnic differences tend to divide people in your village/neighborhood: 1...Not at all 2...Somewhat 3...A lot Coded so that lower values are desirable, as higher values represent increased vulnerability.</p>												
Perceived Religious Differences	<p>D2A. To what extent do you feel that religious differences tend to divide people in your village/neighborhood? 1...Not at all 2...Somewhat 3...A lot Coded so that lower values are desirable, as higher values represent increased vulnerability.</p>												
Justifiability of Religious Violence	<p>D4. Some people think that using arms and violence against civilians in defense of their religion is justified. Other people believe that, no matter what the reason, this kind of violence is never justified. Do you personally feel that using arms and violence against civilians in defense of your religion can be often justified, sometimes justified, or never justified? 1...Often 2...Sometimes 3...Never Coded so that lower values are desirable, as higher values represent increased vulnerability.</p>												
Violence is Effective	<p>D3. When do you think that violence is an effective method to solve problems: often, sometimes, or never? 1...Often 2...Sometimes 3...Never Coded so that lower values are desirable, as higher values represent</p>												

	increased vulnerability.			
Justifiability of Violence in the Name of Islam	D6. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement			
		Disagree	Neither	Agree
	a) Violence in the name of Islam can be justified	1	2	3
	Coded so that lower values are desirable, as higher values represent increased vulnerability.			
U.S. is at war with Islam	D6. Please tell me whether you agree or disagree with the following statement			
		Disagree	Neither	Agree
	b) The United States is at war against Islam, not terrorism	1	2	3
	Coded so that lower values are desirable, as higher values represent increased vulnerability.			
Youth Outlook				
Life Satisfaction	C1. Here is a ladder representing the “ladder of life.” Let’s suppose the top of the ladder (10) is the best possible life for you; and the bottom (0), the worst possible life for you. On which step of the ladder do you personally stand at the present time?			
	Worst Life Best Life 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10			
Economic Outlook	C6. In general, would you say that the economy of [Chad/Niger/Burkina] is better, worse, or about the same than it was a year ago? 1...worse 2...the same 3...better			
Inclusiveness of Middle Schools	C10. Please tell me if you agree or disagree with the following statement...			
		Disagree	Neither	Agree
	a) Education is only for boys, but not for girls	1	2	3
Interest in Community Affairs	C4. Thinking first of your community, would you say you have a great deal of interest, some interest, or very little interest in local community affairs? 1...very little interest 2...some interest 3...a great deal of interest			
Political Knowledge	C13. Now I would like to ask you a few questions about how politics works in [Chad/Niger/Burkina Faso] Do you know how long the term of office is for the President of [Chad/Niger/Burkina Faso]? That is, after he is elected, how many years does he stay in office before the next election? [All countries = 5 years] 1...correct answer given 2...incorrect answer given			
	C14. Do you happen to know how many seats there are in the National Assembly? [Burkina Faso = 127; Chad = 188; Niger = 113]			

	<p>1...correct answer given 2...incorrect answer given Coded for respondents who gave none, one, and two correct answers to these questions.</p>
<p>Experimental Evidence</p>	
<p>Supports Attack with Potential Civilian Casualties</p>	<p>D10. Imagine that you hear on the radio that a Western newspaper has published offensive images of the Prophet Mohammed committing a crime. You could respond to this affront in many ways. I'm going to read you a list of possible responses now. Please listen to them and then tell me how many of the following reactions you would support. Please, do not tell me <i>which</i> options are necessary, only <i>how many</i>.</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> a. A peaceful protest taking place at the Western country's embassy b. Your government demanding a formal apology from the Western country c. Your government declaring war against the Western country d. An attack on the country's embassy that could result in military or civilian casualties [sensitive item] <p>Control group receives items a-c; treatment group receives items a-d.</p>
<p>Supports Islamist Group</p>	<p>D11.</p> <p>[Control] The World Health Organization recently announced a plan to introduce universal Polio vaccination across [Chad/Niger/Burkina Faso]. How much do you approve of such a plan?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1...not at all 2...somewhat 3...quite <p>[Treatment] The World Health Organization recently announced a plan to introduce universal Polio vaccination across [Chad/Niger/Burkina Faso]. It is likely that Al-Qaeda in the Islamic Maghreb (AQIM)/Boko Haram, an Islamist group, will oppose this program. How much do you approve of such a plan?</p> <ul style="list-style-type: none"> 1...not at all 2...somewhat 3...quite <p>AQIM/ Boko Haram treatment condition administered at random on Endline Survey.</p>

Appendix C. Qualitative Data Collection Focus Group and Interviews

Data Collection Zones	Focus Group	Interview Subject
Chad		
N'Djamena 7	Educated Women	Leader of informal sector Leader of Women association
N'Djamena 8	Male Youth	Religious leader
Mao 1	Muslim men	Youth leader
Mao 2	Young girls	Political Leader (Mayor)
Moussoro 1	Men	Radio Animator Political Leader
Moussoro 2	Muslim Women	Religious Leader
Michemiré	Male Youth	Civil society Leader Women Leader
Chadra	Low education women	Traditional Leader Youth Leader
Mondo	Low education men	Women Leader
Ngouri	Female Youth	NGO Leader Religious Leader / Coranic School teacher
Niger		
Agadez	Youth	Youth Leader Journalist
Diffa	Men	Leader of Youth Association Ulema
Maradi	Women	Local Elected Official
Niamey IV	Women	Journalist Ulema
Niamey V	Youth	Local Elected Official Youth Leader
Tessaoua	Men	Journalist Ulema
Tillabéri	Men	Local Elected Official Ulema

Tillabéri	Youth	
Zinder I	Women	Local Elected Official Leader of Youth Association
Zinder II	Youth	Civil Society Organization Actor Ulema
Burkina Faso		
Arbinda	Men	Youth Leader
Ouahigoya	Men	Civil Society Actor Peasant Radio Announcer
Gorom-Gorom	Muslim Men	Youth Association Leader Women's Association Leader Radio Announcer
Seytenga	Rural Women	Mayor
Gourcy	Women	Religious Leader
Dori	Young Men	Religious Leader Women's Association Leader
Gorom-Gorom	Young Men	Radio Announcer
Markoye	Rural Men	Traditional Chief Imam
Ouahigoya	Single Urban Women	Youth Leader
Ouagadougou	Urban Women Educated	Women's Association Leader Informal Sector Youth Leader

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